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Abstract
We study a long-recognised but under-appreciated symmetry called dynamical similarity
and illustrate its relevance to many important conceptual problems in fundamental physics.
Dynamical similarities are general transformations of a system where the unit of Hamilton’s
principal function is rescaled, and therefore represent a kind of dynamical scaling symmetry
with formal properties that differ from many standard symmetry. To study this symmetry, we
introduce a novel set of principles for identifying the surplus structure of a theory designed
to accommodate the distinct features of dynamical similarities. We test our framework on a
variety of examples and find that it sidesteps tensions between dynamic and epistemic aspects of
symmetry while reproducing orthodox intuitions. When applied to cosmology, our framework
prescribes that dynamical similarities should be associated with surplus structure. We then
review previous technical results showing that an elimination of this surplus structure leads to a
resolution of a large class of singularities in general relativity and suggests a novel explanation for
the arrow of time. We conclude by highlighting the potential relevance of dynamical similarity
to thermodynamic and quantum systems.
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Suppose that in one night all the dimensions of the universe became a thousand times
larger. The world will remain similar to itself, if we give the word similitude the
meaning it has in the third book of Euclid. Only, what was formerly a metre long will
now measure a kilometre, and what was a millimetre long will become a metre. The
bed in which I went to sleep and my body itself will have grown in the same
proportion. When I awake in the morning what will be my feeling in face of such an
astonishing transformation? Well, I shall not notice anything at all. The most exact
measures will be incapable of revealing anything of this tremendous change, since the
yard-measures I shall use will have varied in exactly the same proportions as the
objects I shall attempt to measure.
The relativity of space from Science and method
Henri Poincaré, 1908 (translation 2003).
1 Introduction
1.1 Similarity and conceptual problems in modern physics
In Henri Poincaré’s magistral Science and Method (Poincaré, 2003) we’re invited to image a universe
like our own that is identical in every respect except that it is a thousand times larger. Such a
universe, he argues, would be indiscernible from our own because any reference standard that could
be used to measure the length of a body would have grown in exact proportion the length of that
body, and therefore any measurement using this standard would be unaffected. He calls such a
transformation a similarity in reference to the same geometric symmetry discussed as early as
Euclid.
Poincaré’s argument for indiscernibility under similarity can be applied more generally to mea-
surements of temporal duration. If duration is measured using relative changes within a system —
say by recording the number of oscillations of the pendulum of a clock — then, by Poincaré’s ar-
gument, the transformed system should be indiscernible from the original, and therefore no change
in duration can be measured.
But compared to length, representations of duration are made considerably more subtle by
dynamical considerations. Useful standards of duration are defined by their ability to bring the
dynamical laws into a particular form. For example, absolute time in Newtonian mechanics is
defined in terms of inertial motion, which in turn is determined by the form of the dynamical laws.
The precise way that a similarity transformation acts on the representations of a dynamical system
is therefore affected by how the temporal standards depend on the laws. This requires a more
comprehensive approach.
The most important consideration in defining such an approach is the way in which the form
of the laws affects the transformation properties of the velocities. In Lagrangian theories, length
and time standards are related by the conventions used to define the unit of Hamilton’s principal
function. Heuristically speaking, this unit defines a standard of angular momentum that can be
used to convert lengths to velocities using some convention for inertial mass. We will call similarity
transformations that take into account the dynamical considerations involved in defining velocity
dynamical similarities because of their relation to the transformations of the same name first studied
in the context of the Kepler problem (see Section 3.2.1 for the explicit connection).
The goal of this paper is to give a detailed analysis of dynamical similarity. We will show
that, while often recognised in different guises, dynamical similarity is a vastly under-appreciated
symmetry in many physical systems with significant implications for major conceptual problems in
modern physics. To show this, we will develop a general framework for understanding symmetries,
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test this framework on some well-known examples and then apply it to dynamical similarity in
interesting physical systems. Our framework sidesteps previously studied tensions identified in the
literature and provides normative criteria for identifying the eliminable representational structure
of a theory.1 This surplus structure can be vividly described as the “extra mathematical hooks on
which to hang the mental structures that we project onto the phenomena” (Ismael & Van Fraassen,
2003). Thus, while surplus structure is often useful in crafting a theory, it can be safely eliminated
without affecting the ability of a theory to model the phenomena.
With this in mind, we will apply our framework to a cosmological setting and find that dynamical
similarity relates surplus structure. We will then review previous technical results2 that show how
many kinds of singularities in general relativity — including those of certain important big bang
and black hole solutions — are removed when dynamically-similar structure is taken to be surplus.
Finally, we will see that a novel explanation for the arrow of time arises for such systems.
Central to our arguments is our analysis of symmetry. We will develop a principle, which we
will call the Principle of Essential and Sufficient Autonomy (PESA), that we will use to identify
the observable structures of a theory. While the PESA can be applied to general symmetries, it will
be introduced here in order to accommodate certain non-standard formal properties of dynamical
similarity that prevent an analysis in terms of standard techniques. When a theory is found to be
empirically adequate, the PESA gives a clear prescription for identifying its indiscernible models.3
The Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) may then be used to motivate the elimination
of surplus structure. The two-step application of the PESA and the PII sidesteps tensions between
dynamic and epistemic definitions of symmetry discussed at length in the literature4 by separating
formal properties of symmetry from contingent facts about the world. More importantly, the PESA
gives precise dynamical criteria that, when combined with the PII, can be used to demarcate
observable and surplus structure by considering the number of independent input data required
to solve the evolution equations. In this way our novel proposal represents a distinct alternative
to category-theoretic (cf. Weatherall (2016); Nguyen et al. (2020); Bradley & Weatherall (2020))
definitions of surplus structure or other recent proposals for analysing symmetry (cf. Caulton
(2015); Dewar (2019); Martens & Read (n.d.)) that do not provide specific dynamical criteria that
can be applied to dynamical similarity. To test our formalism, we will apply it to some well-
studied physical examples5 and reproduce orthodox views on the interpretation of symmetry in
those systems. Passing these tests give us confidence that the PESA combined with the PII can
be reliably applied to the novel cosmological applications of dynamical similarity considerer in this
paper.
After establishing the reliability of the PESA, we will turn attention to dynamical similarity.
Following and expanding upon Sloan (2018), we will give a general definition of dynamical similarity,
illustrate how it is importantly different from other symmetries in physics, and develop a general
scheme for eliminating surplus structure due to dynamical similarity in different contexts. In
applying the PESA and the PII to different physical systems, we will find that when dynamical
1In this paper it will be convenient to define surplus structure as eliminable structure according to one of the
senses of surplus structure discussed in Nguyen et al. (2020); Bradley & Weatherall (2020). This is because, in the
examples we will discuss, dynamically similar surplus structure will be explicitly eliminable. It is, however, possible
to rephrase our discussion by taking surplus structure to be a representational redundancy instead.
2Mostly notably those developed in Koslowski et al. (2018) and Sloan (2019).
3We use the word ‘model’ in the philosopher’s sense as the representation of a possibility. This usually translates,
in physics jargon, to an ‘history’ or sometimes a ‘solution’ of a theory.
4See for example Ismael & Van Fraassen (2003); Roberts (2008); Healey (2009); Belot (2013); Dasgupta (2016);
Wallace (2019b); Belot (2018) and the more extended discussions in Section 2.1.1.
5These cover many of the prominent situations discussed in Kosso (2000); Brading & Brown (2004); Greaves &
Wallace (2014); Belot (2013); Wallace (2019a) and Saunders (2013); Knox (2014). See Section 3 for details.
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similarities act on approximately (but not completely) isolated subsystems of the universe, the
removal of dynamically similar structure is not justified. This applies to many well-studied cases
in physics including Kepler’s third law and certain scaling symmetries discussed in Belot (2013).
Here, our analysis is consistent with standard interpretations. But when dynamical similarities
act on the universe, our formalism prescribes that the removal of dynamically similar structure is
justified. This applies, in particular, to modern theories of cosmology.
To be more concrete about the implications of removing dynamically similar structure, we will
develop a conceptual framework, leveraged on previous formal results, in which pathologies in the
evolution equations of certain cosmological systems will be seen to be due to the surplus struc-
ture introduced by dynamical similarity. These pathologies can then be removed if the symmetry
is understood as relating indiscernible states of the universe. This leads to a form of singularity
resolution in a classical theory of gravity. Moreover, mathematical features unique to dynamical
similarity will be shown to define certain privileged structures — namely attractors and so called
Janus points (to be defined in Section 4.3) — on the space of indiscernible models of cosmological
theories. In addition, the dynamics on the space of discernible states will be seen to have a funda-
mentally frictional character. The privileged structures and the friction-like behaviour establish a
preferred arrow of time for observers that find themselves in a state near an attractor. This suggests
a novel solution to the problem of the arrow of time similar to that proposed in Barbour et al.
(2014) and Barbour (2020). Finally, the central role played by the standard of angular momentum
in Lagrangian theories with dynamical similarity suggests exciting implications for the foundations
of statistical and quantum mechanics. Removing the “extra mathematical hooks” of dynamical
similarity thus has significant implications for many empirical and conceptual problems in modern
physics.
1.2 The dynamics of similarity
In the previous section we described how a similarity transformation should act on the representa-
tions of a dynamical system. We highlighted the subtle role of the dynamical laws in determining
the transformation properties of the velocities. We will now make these comments more precise by
giving a formal definition of dynamical similarity. This definition will provide the starting point
for the analysis of the remainder of the paper.
Our definition must involve a statement of the laws themselves because these define the con-
venient temporal standards for the theory. It will thus be helpful in our analysis to restrict to a
general class of dynamical systems called Lagrangian systems. A Lagrangian system is a system
whose dynamically possible models (DPMs), γDMP, are those curves on the state space of the the-
ory that are stationary points of an action functional, S[γ], such that δS[γ]|γDPM = 0. Given such
a system, we define a dynamical similarity as a transformation that rescales the action functional
by a constant:6
S[γ]→ cS[γ′] . (1)
Under this definition, if γ is a DPM then γ′ is also a DPM because (1) preserves the stationary
condition of S[γ]. Dynamical similarities, when they exist, therefore map DPMs to DPMs, and
consequently preserve the truth of the laws.
To understand how such transformations match the intuitions of the previous section, consider
that the units of S are those of angular momentum, and therefore that the effect of a dynamical
6More specifically, dynamical similarities will be maps on certain representational structures (see Section 4.1) of
the theory that induce a pullback of S that is a rescaling of it.
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similarity is to actively rescale the global standard of angular momentum for the system.7 Different
choices of c therefore represent different ratios between the standard of length and the standard
of velocity. Using these transformations, one can then determine how to rescale the standards
of length and time to produce a similarity transformation that preserves the truth of the laws.
In Section 4.1, we will see more explicitly how to do this in general (e.g., Equation 21) and in
Sections 3.2.2 we treat two examples that help to build intuition for dynamical similarity and the
situations in which it should be expected to have important implications for physics.
We end these introductory remarks with two important comments that will figure prominently
in our discussions below.
First, dynamical similarities are somewhat unconventional symmetries in that they do not pre-
serve the formal relationships between position and momentum.8 This distinguishes them from
other well-known gauge symmetries of physics such as those of electromagnetism, the standard
model of particle physics and general relativity. Because of these differences, dynamical similari-
ties cannot be treated using standard physics tools that assume symmetries of a standard form.9
The PESA, however, will apply to dynamical similarity by construction. As we will see, these
peculiarities are what leads to so many of the interesting and noteworthy features of dynamical
similarity.
Second, as we will see in Section 3.2.1, well-known applications of dynamical similarity concern
subsystems of the universe and take dynamical similarities to transform between discernible models
of a theory. As an example, dynamical similarities transform between distinct planetary orbits
according to Kepler’s third law. It is therefore important that the PESA and the PII reproduce
these intuitions while also justifying our novel treatment of cosmology. We will see in Sections 3.2.1
and 5.1.1 that this is indeed the case.
Third, standard practice in cosmology recognises that similarity transformations relate indis-
cernible states of the world. It is an uncontroversial fact that the observational data in cosmology
are independent of the convention used for fixing spatial size.10 What is not generally recognised,
however, are the dynamical implications of this fact. In particular, the surplus structure associated
with dynamical similarity is usually retained within the formalism. The remarkable consequences
for cosmology that we will explore in this paper are a direct consequence of explicitly treating
dynamical similarity as one would any symmetry that relates indiscernible states of the world.
1.3 Prospectus
Two main questions will be addressed in this paper:
1. When do dynamical similarities relate indiscernible states?
2. What happens in certain physical systems when dynamically similar states are treated as
identical?
We will develop a general procedure for addressing the first question in Section 2. First, we
will set up a framework for symmetries in Section 2.1 that distinguishes two kinds of symmetry:
universal symmetries that act on the universe as a whole and subsystem symmetries that act on
isolated subsystems. Knowing which context — universal or subsystem — applies to any given
7Throughout this paper, we will use an active notion of dynamical similarity whereby the dynamical similarities
will be thought of as rescaling the standard of angular momentum of the system.
8I.e., dynamical similarities do not preserve symplectic structure. These features will be expanded upon in Sec-
tion 4.1.1.
9E.g., Noether’s theorem and Dirac’s algorithm. The PESA is compared with Dirac’s algorithm in Section 2.2.
10To be more precise, the observational data is independent of the initial value of the scalar factor.
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theory is a subtle matter. We will propose the PESA, which we define in Section 2.2, to provide
clear criteria for identifying the surplus structure of a theory, and therefore clearly distinguishing
between these contexts.
We will then test our proposal in Section 3. First we explore the well-studied Galilean boosts as
examples of universal (Section 3.1.1) and subsystem (Section 3.1.2) symmetries. In Section 3.2.1 we
then explore the Kepler problem, and see that Kepler’s third law results from dynamical similarity
being a subsystem symmetry. In all these examples, the PESA is seen to reproduce orthodox
views. In Section 3.2.2 we develop intuition for dynamical similarity as a universal symmetry by
considering hypothetical models related to the Kepler problem.
The remaining sections of the paper will be devoted to giving a more precise definition of dy-
namical similarity, which expands upon the formalism presented in Sloan (2018), and addressing
the second question posed above. We will highlight the main representational features of dynamical
similarity in Section 4.1, and outline a general procedure for writing a dynamically-similar descrip-
tion of Lagrangian systems in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3 we will then describe how some of the
interesting features resulting from dynamical similarity arise.
Finally, in Section 5 we review some results of Koslowski et al. (2018) and Sloan (2019) and
show how our framework can be used to address several important conceptual problems in modern
physics. In Section 5.1, we show how removing the surplus structure due to dynamical similarity
can resolve the initial singularity (i.e., the big bang) in an important class of cosmological theories.
And in Section 5.2 we describe how these results may generalise to a larger class of singularities in
general relativity. As a final application in Section 5.3 we discuss how dynamical similarity leads
to a new proposal from solving the problem of the arrow of time. In Section 6 we conclude by
summarising and discussing some potential applications to the foundations of thermodynamics and
quantum mechanics.
2 The Principle of Essential and Sufficient Autonomy
Methods for removing excess structure are much more than mopping up procedures.
They are not something merely to be done after our representations have been
crafted, like portraitists erasing stray pencil marks, or sculptors removing extra clay.
Methods for removing excess structure are the very heart of theorizing.
(Ismael & Van Fraassen, 2003, Ch. 23, p.390).
2.1 The very heart of theorizing
In this section we will introduce a powerful normative principle, central to our analysis, that we
will call the Principle of Essential and Sufficient Autonomy (PESA). This principle identifies the
representational structures of a theory that are observable, and distinguishes these from those that
are surplus. It can thus be used to identify and remove excess structure. The PESA is closely
related to what Barbour has called Poincaré’s principle11 but differs importantly in the way that
it evades certain ontological subtleties that we will outline below.
As we will see, the virtues of the PESA are not necessary obvious when contemplating a theory
purely at the formal level. Rather, the PESA’s appeal is most apparent during the process of
11The principle was introduced in Barbour & Bertotti (1982). See Section 5 of Barbour (2010) for the historical
connection with Poincaré.
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theory-construction. Within this process, the PESA is an extremely useful conceptual and formal
tool for developing and refining a particular theory.
In Ismael & Van Fraassen (2003), theory-construction is described as a two-stage process:
There are two stages in theory construction. The first is to generate a set of models rich
enough to embed the phenomena, the second is to attempt to simplify those models
by exposing and eliminating excess structure. Continuing in this way the structure of
the models is pared down, being careful not to jeopardize their capacity to embed the
phenomena. [p.390]
We find this characterisation compelling because it highlights the delicate balance that must be
achieved between wanting to reduce the amount of surplus structure and retaining the ability to
describe the phenomena. The PESA aims to find this balance by imposing precise mathematical
criteria. But before we can state the principle explicitly, it will first be necessary to address some
known problems related to defining symmetry.
2.1.1 Dynamics versus epistemology
The broad topic of ‘symmetry’ has been extensively discussed in the philosophical literature. An
important question in these discussions is what, if any, metaphysical or epistemological conclusions
can be drawn from symmetries. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the answers provided to this question
depend upon the way that symmetries are defined. Defining symmetry involves some well-known
difficulties that originate from a tension between the dynamical and epistemic aspects of symmetry.
This tension can be used to divide definitions of symmetry into those that make use of the dynamical
properties of a theory or those that make use of epistemic considerations.12
Dynamic definitions of symmetry define symmetries as structure-preserving transformations
between a theory’s DPMs. Such definitions have proved useful, for example, when the dynamic
symmetries are compared with the space-time symmetries of a theory according to the analysis of
(Earman, 1989, §3.4). In such approaches the formal invariances of the underlying mathematical
structures of a theory are believed to support reliable inferences about the ontological properties
of the world.
Epistemic definitions of symmetry define symmetries as transformations between a theory’s in-
discernible models. In such definitions, it is an epistemic consideration — namely, indiscernibility
— that is used as the primary criterion for defining a symmetry transformation. Such attempts are
exemplified by the approach of Dasgupta (2016) linking good notions of symmetry to undetectabil-
ity.
While some authors (e.g., Wallace (2019b)) have framed the tension between dynamic and
epistemic definitions as a dialectic between opposing camps, it is often difficult to find useful
definitions of symmetry that fit cleanly into one camp or the other. Nevertheless, it is easy to
provide examples where dynamic and epistemic considerations lead to incompatible conclusions.
Using such examples, Belot (2013, §1) shows how the “unhappy” combination of dynamic and
epistemic considerations leads to a “recipe for disaster” when trying to provide a precise definition
of symmetry. Similar examples can be found in Roberts (2008), where the tension is framed as a
“puzzle.”
A vivid way to illustrate the origin of this tension is to consider systems where symmetries are
seen to have direct empirical consequences. Examples where this occurs are given in Kosso (2000)
and further details have been discussed in Brading & Brown (2004); Greaves & Wallace (2014);
12An alternative way to characterise the difference between ‘dynamic’ and ‘epistemic’ definitions of symmetry is in
terms of ‘theoretical’ versus ‘empirical’ symmetries as defined in Healey (2009).
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Friederich (2015); Gomes (2020). In such cases, symmetry transformations that act uniformly on
the representations of a subsystem can fit the dynamical definition of a symmetry — in that they
preserve the truth of the laws — but not the epistemic definition — in that they relate empirically
distinguishable states.
Perhaps the most well-studied example is that of Galileo’s ship, which will be discussed in detail
in Section 3.1.2. In this example, a ship is moving almost frictionlessly with respect to a shore.
Galileo boost transformations of the ship that leave the shore fixed preserve the truth of the laws
but relate discernible states of the system. We will have much more to say about symmetries of this
kind later. But for now we note that they are exemplars for illustrating how dynamic definitions
of symmetry do not always agree with purely epistemic definitions.
To sidestep difficulties of this kind, we will attempt to avoid metaphysical considerations as
much as possible in our analysis of symmetry. Instead, we will focus on the ability, or inability, of a
theory to describe phenomena. We will try to draw a clear separation between the formal definition
of a theory and the contingent fact of whether that theory can usefully describe the world. By
insisting on this separation, we can refrain from making ontological commitments based on the
purely formal properties of a theory that will put dynamical definitions of symmetry in conflict
with epistemic considerations.
Because of this, we will not be able to draw strong metaphysical conclusions from symmetries.
But this does not mean that nothing useful can be learned from our analysis of symmetry. Quite to
the contrary, we will be able to identify different theoretical contexts where dynamical definitions of
symmetry have different relations to the phenomena. These contexts will highlight different kinds
of symmetry that have a variety of useful implications for theorizing. This leads to a rich view of
symmetry that can be usefully applied to a multitude of different physical systems.
2.1.2 Kinds of symmetry
Given the considerations of the previous section, we will find it useful, on the one hand, to define
symmetries in a more ‘dynamic’ tradition in terms of formal transformations that preserve certain
representational structures of a theory. At a minimum, we will require that a symmetry preserve a
theory’s DPMs. However, symmetries can, and usually do, preserve additional structures. When
they do we can characterise symmetries according to those structures (e.g., ‘space-time symmetries’
preserve certain space-time structure).13
We will also find it useful, on the other hand, to appeal to a more ‘epistemic’ tradition by
distinguishing different theoretical contexts that characterise the relationship between the formally
defined symmetries of a theory and the empirical properties of the world. In this way, we will
allow for symmetries to be transformations both between surplus structure and certain measurable
quantities. Guided by the examples discussed above where symmetries are seen to have direct em-
pirical consequences, we will define two kinds of symmetry that will distinguish different theoretical
contexts where symmetries will relate both discernible and indiscernible states.
To make our language more precise, we will first gives some definitions. We will call physical
structures the structures in the world that are the targets of our theoretical representations. We
then call observable structure, or simply observables, the (suitably interpreted) representational
substructures of the models of a theory that are candidates for the representations of physical
13A vast framework for analysing symmetry in this way for the purposes of understanding temporal symmetry in
quantum gravity will be presented in Gryb & Thébault (In prepration). This is in the same spirit as category-theoretic
definitions of symmetry in terms of structure-preserving isomorphisms such as those discussed in Weatherall (2016);
Nguyen et al. (2020); Bradley & Weatherall (2020).
9
structures.14 Conversely, we will call surplus structure any representational structure in the theory
that can be eliminated while preserving empirical content.15 Finally, we say that a theory is
empirically adequate if the theory has one model whose observable structures are isomorphic to all
physical structures.
Using this language, we define a universal symmetry as a symmetry that leaves invariant all
the observable structures of a theory. Canonical examples of universal symmetries are the bulk
diffeomorphism symmetries in general relativity and gauge symmetries of classical electromagnetism
and Yang–Mills theory.16 It is important to emphasise that this definition is independent of whether
a theory with a universal symmetry is empirically adequate or not. We can then define a universal
context in which the empirical adequacy of a theory with a universal symmetry is being investigated.
It is only once this context has been specified that different prescriptive ontological commitments,
pertaining for example to surplus structure, can be assessed.
We define a subsystem symmetry as a symmetry that leaves invariant some, but not all, observ-
able structures of a theory.17 The subsystem in question is simply the set of observable structures
on which the symmetry acts non-trivially. A canonical example of a subsystem symmetry is the
boost symmetry of a Galileo ship. We can then define a subsystem context in which the empirical
adequacy of a theory with a subsystem symmetry is being investigated. We note that the terms
‘universal’ and ‘subsystem’ do not reference the domain of applicability of the theory itself. Thus,
universal symmetries can arise in theories that are themselves not considered to be universal (e.g.,
the U(1) invariance of electromagnetism).
2.1.3 Two problems for a theory
In this section, we will try to motivate the PESA by highlighting two important ways in which a
theory can be problematic in being able to describe phenomena. The PESA will then be designed
to identify these deficiencies. This identification will be a subtle task in the cosmological examples
we will consider later. To begin, we must first be clear about what we will understand a theory to
be.
We will understand a theory to broadly constitute two things: i) a statement of its DPMs by a
specification of its basic mathematical structures and laws, and ii) a collections of hypotheses about
how these models are related to structures in the world. These hypotheses include assumptions
about measurement procedures, and must provide maps between observables and physical struc-
tures.18 In this way a theory, on our view, must itself specify all of its observables. Given this way
of understanding a theory, one first hypothesises about which quantities are observables, and then
checks for empirically adequacy as a test of these hypotheses. Because of this, whether a particular
symmetry is universal or subsystem could depend simply on which structures the theory identifies
as observable.
14We adopt the word ‘observables’ to reflect the language used by working physicists for the gauge-invariant
structures of a theory. Note the potential confusion of using the word ‘observables’ to refer to the representational
structures of a theory and not the ‘observed’ structures in the world.
15Although we will not do so here, we should note that our analysis and, in particular, the definition of the PESA
could be rephrased by taking surplus structure to be redundant structure.
16When gauge-conserving boundary conditions have been imposed (cf. Belot (2018)).
17This definition matches the formal definition of a regional symmetry as defined in Gomes (2020), but where the
structures that shift the region are observable in the theory in question. We defer to that paper for a more technical
definition.
18In the DEKI account of representation developed in Frigg & Nguyen (2020), these maps correspond to a key for
how interpreted representations (i.e., our ‘observables’) are used to exemplify properties that can be imputed onto
the target system.
10
There are two ways that a theory’s observables can be inadequate in describing the phenomena
of the world. In the first case, a theory can have too few observables to describe all the physical
structures. Such a theory cannot be empirically adequate and must either be rejected or extended.
This situation is usually straightforward to diagnose because there will be phenomena that the
theory can’t describe.
In the second case, a theory can have too many observables than are strictly necessary for
describing the physical structures. Here, if the system is deterministic then the dynamics of the ob-
servables are underdetermined by the phenomena. The evolution equations of the theory therefore
cannot be solved in terms of the observables in question.
It might seem that such underdetermination would be obvious to diagnose. But because it is
often possible to fix the extraneous observables by making various auxiliary assumptions (often
implicitly), this second case is usually more subtle to diagnose than the first. In this case, a theory
may be believed to be empirically adequate — i.e., it may be believed to have an isomorphism
between observables and physical structures — even though it posits unnecessary observables, and
therefore the map between observables and physical structures is in fact many-to-one. Such a
misdiagnosis can lead to faulty conceptualising that misinterprets surplus for observable structure.
We will see that this is precisely what happens with dynamically-similar structure in the applications
of Section 5. In those cases, the PESA will be our primary guide towards deciding the appropriate
set of observables for describing the phenomena.
2.2 The PESA
We have now compiled the necessary ingredients to state the PESA. Consider a theory whose
representations involve a general state ψ(t, a) ∈ Γ in some state space Γ at time t that is specified
by an algebra element a ∈ A,19, which is some (possibly non-proper) subset of the representational
structures of the theory. We further require that the state at time t be specifiable in terms of a
state at an earlier time t0 < t according to,
ψ (t, a(t)) = f (ψ (t0, a(t0))) , (2)
where f : Γ→ Γ is some automorphism on Γ. In the theories we will be interested in, we importantly
require that the maps f are specified by the laws of the theory and are determined by the solutions
of a system of equations in terms of t and a. The equations in question are often differential (or
difference) equations, and it is thus natural to require that the representational structures a have
at least an algebraic structure.
Let P denote the space of all independent physical structures being studied by the theory. We
then consider the maps O : A → P from the algebra of representational structures to the space
of physical structures.20 The Principle of Essential and Sufficient Autonomy (PESA) then states
that the algebra elements a are the observables of a theory when:
(i) The evolution equations (2) are well-posed and autonomous in the algebra A.
(ii) The maps O are onto; i.e., the algebra A has sufficient structure for representing P.
(iii) The maps O are one-to-one; i.e., the algebra A has a necessary (or essential) amount structure
for representing P.
19An algebra is a vector space equipped with both an addition and multiplication operation.
20The representational structures a are assumed to be equipped with a suitable interpretation. When this is done,
the maps O can be roughly thought of as providing a key as defined in the DEKI account of representation developed
in Frigg & Nguyen (2020).
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The criterion (i) implies that the evolution equations be well-posed, that the time t be uniquely
specifiable in terms of an element of the algebra a(t), and that the states of a theory can be specified
without referencing an external time parameter. The criterion (ii) requires that the algebra A has
enough structure to be able to uniquely solve the evolution equations. The criterion (iii) ensures
that the algebra A does not have more structure than is necessary to uniquely solve the evolution
equations. When all three criteria are satisfied, we say that the algebra A forms the observable
algebra of the theory.
The autonomy requirement is motivated by the observation that the PESA has prescriptive
force only when the dynamical laws of the theory in question depend on a closed set of structures.
If the laws were to depend on additional external structures, then the PESA would be incapable
of assessing whether these external structures are observable or not. The autonomy requirement
therefore demands that one consider all structures — particularly the evolution parameter(s) —
involved in solving the dynamical equations when determining the observable algebra of a theory.21
The two criterion of sufficiency and necessity are directly motivated by the two ways discussed in
the previous section that a theory can be inadequate in accounting for the phenomena: namely that
the theory can either have too few or too many observables. These criteria are also clearly motivated
by the two stages of theory-construction highlighted in the quote from Ismael & Van Fraassen (2003)
at the beginning of Section 2.1. The PESA is simply a way to formalise these intuitions into precise
mathematical criteria that link the well-posedness of the evolution equations of a theory to its
observables. In practice, the value of the PESA is in emphasising that one should explicitly test
for each criterion — autonomy, sufficiency and necessity — separately.
To clarify how the principle should be used in practice, under the PESA all structures that
must be specified in order to solve a computational algorithm for determining the future state
of a system should be part of the observable algebra. This includes initial or boundary data for
the dynamical equations. But it also includes all other parameters of the theory such as particle
masses and couplings constants. In this way, certain structures can easily be under-counted when
constructing the observable algebra.
Conversely, the observable algebra can also be over-counted because it is not always obvious
that a structure can be removed without compromising the ability of a theory to define the maps O.
For instance, in a theory where gauge-fixing conditions are used to give a unique evolution to the
equations of a system, the map between gauge-fixed structures and physical structures is not one-to-
one because many gauge-fixing conditions can be used to describe the same phenomena. The PESA
would therefore prescribe against identifying gauge-fixed and observable structures because of the
necessity criterion (iii). We will see important examples in Section 5.2 where certain structures can
be removed from the observable algebra of general relativity without affecting the predictions for
cosmology. In such cases, the PESA prescribes that the theory should be expressible in terms of
the smallest possible autonomous algebra.
The PESA can be usefully compared and contrasted with standard techniques for analysing
surplus structure in the physics literature. A standard technique that is similar to the PESA, called
the Dirac algorithm after the procedure developed in Dirac (2001) (see Henneaux & Teitelboim
(1992) for a modern treatment), also defines an observable algebra using the formal properties
of the evolution equations. The observable algebra in question defines the Dirac observables as
representational structures in terms of which the evolution equations are well-posed.22 The Dirac
observables, however, are defined using specific formal structures that exist only for certain kinds
21The autonomy requirement is also very helpful for treating dynamical similarities since these usually rescale the
evolution parameter, and so the invariant system is usually expressed as an autonomous set of differential equations.
22More specifically, the Dirac observables are those functions on the phase space of a Hamiltonian representation
of a theory that commute with all the first class constraints of the theory.
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of theories (see footnote 22). As we will see in Section 4.1.1, theories where dynamically similar
structure is surplus cannot be analysed using such techniques because the formal properties of
dynamical similarity violate the conditions under which the Dirac algorithm can be applied. The
PESA (or something like it) is therefore required for an analysis of dynamical similarity.
It should be emphasised the necessity criterion (iii) is not simply an Occamist norm. If a theory
identifies observables that are unnecessary, then that theory may provide false explanations or
predictions that rely on the behaviour of the unnecessary observables. We note, however, that the
PESA aims makes no metaphysical claims about the explanatory role of surplus and observable
structures. Instead it highlights the fact that these play different formal roles in finding well-
posed evolution equations. Moreover, the PESA does not demand an explicit characterisation of
the observable algebra. In many theories, such as general relativity and Yang–Mills theory, no
such explicit construction is available. In such cases an implicit characterisation of the observable
algebra, using for example dynamical constraints, that formally identifies the maps O is sufficient.
Our formalism is thus compatible with the different notions of surplus structure discussed in Dewar
(2019); Nguyen et al. (2020); Bradley & Weatherall (2020).
In the universal context, the autonomy requirement removes any dependence of the evolution
of a theory’s state on temporal structures that do not exist within the theory. In the subsystem
context, if there is a temporal structure external to the subsystem in question, then this structure
must exist somewhere in the observable algebra of the theory.
2.2.1 Poincaré observables
The observable algebra selected by the PESA is similar to a proposal made at least as early as
Poincaré, and which has been re-emphasised in Barbour & Bertotti (1982) in the form of Poincaré’s
principle. One of the key ways in which the PESA differs from these earlier proposals is that, in
separating a theory’s formal symmetries from contingent facts, the PESA is agnostic to metaphysical
claims about the world. The principle is therefore neither committed to Poincaré’s instrumentalism
nor to Barbour’s relationalism. It is nevertheless helpful to highlight the close relationship between
the PESA and Poincaré’s writings.
In Chapter 7 of Science and Hypothesis (Poincaré, 1913), Poincaré studies the case of relative
motion and in particular is considering the ontological status of the absolute orientation of a
Keplerian system in absolute space. He is particularly concerned with the role of angular momentum
effects in such a system if it is treated as isolated, where “thick clouds hide the stars from men
who cannot observe them, and even are ignorant of their existence.”[p.109] In this context, he asks:
“How will those men know that the earth turns round?” In our language, he is considering the role
of rotational symmetry in the universal context.
He notices that the interpretation of angular momentum in this system is ambiguous and can be
treated in at least two ways: on the one hand as a constant of motion (which he calls an ‘accidental
constant’) in an experimentally undetectable absolute space, and on the other hand as a constant
of nature (which he calls an ‘essential constant’) encoded in the relational laws of the epistemically
accessible universe. In the end, he concludes that choosing between the two amounts “only the
choice of hypotheses.” He emphasises that what matters are the precise number of data required
to describe the phenomena: [p.114]
“Provided that the future indications of our instruments can only depend on the indica-
tions which they have given us, or that they might have formerly given us [autonomy],
such is all we want [sufficiency], and with these conditions we may rest satisfied [neces-
sity].”
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In the quote above, we’ve indicated how the criteria of autonomy, sufficiency and necessity, which are
required by the PESA, appear to play an essential role in Poincaré’s analysis. Moreover, he focuses
on the total number of independent data required to find the future state of the system, which is
how we defined the observable algebra above. For these reasons, we will refer to the elements of the
observable algebra specified by the PESA simply as Poincaré observables in analogy to the Dirac
observables commonly defined in the physics literature on gauge theories.
2.3 The PESA and indiscernibility
It is clear that Poincaré had strong empiricist intuitions in mind when emphasising the role of
what we have called Poincaré observables. While he admits that the conventional interpretation of
universal angular momentum in terms of changes of orientation in absolute space is “the most con-
venient solution for the geometer”, he adds that “it is not the most satisfactory for the philosopher,
because this orientation does not exist” [emphasis added].
While we will not find it necessary to endorse Poincaré’s metaphysics, we do think that some-
thing can be usefully gained by considering the Poincaré observables. When a theory is found to
be empirically adequate, we will take the view that any transformations that leave the Poincaré
observables invariant relate states that should be ontologically identified. This view, we believe, is
strongly motivated by the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII).
When a theory is empirically adequate, there is an isomorphism between the Poincaré observ-
ables of one of a theory’s models and all physical structures. Thus, only changes in the Poincaré
observables can lead to discernible states. States where the Poincaré observables take the same
value are therefore indiscernible, and should be identified under the PII.
We can compare the PESA when combined with the PII to standard treatments of symmetry
given in the philosophical literature. We restrict our discussion to a proposal made in Caulton
(2015) because of its strong similarities to our own proposal. Caulton begins by defining what he
calls an analytic symmetry. In our terminology, an analytic symmetry corresponds roughly to a
symmetry that relates surplus structure.23 The proposal is then described in two phases:
During the first phase we set up representational links between the theory and the
observable portion of the physical world, under the assumption that the theory is em-
pirically adequate (or similar). In the second phase, we maximise the theory’s analytic
symmetries, taking advantage of the representational links forged in the first phase so
as not to compromise empirical adequacy. [§4]
This procedure is clearly very close to the one we endorse in this paper. Once the appropriate
representational links have been set up, maximising a theory’s analytic symmetries is analogous
to the necessity criterion (iii). The sufficiency criterion (ii) is automatically satisfied when the
theory is empirically adequate. Thus, the main difference between the proposals is our emphasis on
having well-posed, autonomous evolution equations. More specifically, the PESA links observable
structure to those structures that provide the necessary and sufficient input data for the evolution
equations. Such a requirement does not exist within Caulton’s proposal. It is inspired by the Dirac
algorithm but applicable to more general transformations such as dynamical similarity.
The two-step process of specifying observables using the PESA and then identifying states using
the PII will be our main methodology for analysing dynamical similarity. Using examples we will
now see that this process is consistent with the standard treatment of gauge symmetries in physics.
23Some notable differences: there is no requirement in Caulton (2015) that a symmetry relate DPMs and structures
are assumed to take specific values (i.e., they are treated as quantities).
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3 Assessing (in)discernibility in familiar examples
3.1 Galilean boosts
We will now illustrate the power of the PESA by applying it to some well-studied examples of
symmetry in the literature. The first example we will consider is the that of the Galilean boost
symmetries. These act on a Newtonian system by transforming the velocities, ~̇qI , of rigid bodies
(or point particles) by a constant vector ~a:
~̇qI → ~̇qI + ~a , (3)









− V (~qI) , (4)
where mI are the masses of the bodies and V (~qI) is the potential energy function invariant under
Euclidean transformations of the centre-of-mass positions ~qI of the bodies.
3.1.1 Barbour–Berttoti theory: boosts as a universal symmetry
To understand the sense in which the Galilean boost symmetries (3) can be thought of as univer-
sal symmetries of Newtonian mechanics, we first recall some well-studied facts about Newtonian
mechanics. Newton was able to produce an empirically adequate theory of planetary motion by
assuming that isolated systems are described by indiscernible states related by Galilean boosts act-
ing on the system. This fact is stated and proved in Corollary V of Newton’s Principia (Newton,
1999).24
An efficient way to understand this invariance in a modern language is to follow a procedure
developed in Barbour & Bertotti (1982) where an isolated Newtonian system is actively boosted
by introducing auxiliary fields ~b(t) that are allowed to be arbitrary functions of time. The boosted










− V (~qI) . (5)
The Euler–Lagrange equations for ~b say that the system must be invariant under arbitrary infinites-








are the generalised momenta of the system. This condition can always be satisfied
by actively moving to centre-of-mass coordinates, where the total linear momentum of any system
is always zero even if the centre-of-mass itself might have an arbitrary time dependence. When the
dynamical constraints (6) are satisfied (e.g., when working in centre-of-mass coordinates), it is easy
to see that the original Lagrangian transforms in such a way that
S → S + φ , (7)
24Corollary VI states that this is also the case for isolated systems undergoing arbitrary linear accelerations.
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for some constant φ, and therefore that Galilean boosts preserve the stationary points of the action.
They are thus a symmetry of the theory by our definition.
The PESA can now be used to identify observables and provide clarity on the ontological sta-
tus of global boosts in Newtonian mechanics. For isolated systems, the remarkable success of
Newtonian mechanics illustrates that (active) centre-of-mass coordinates can be used to write an
empirically adequate theory of planetary motion. Moreover, Corollary V, or equivalently the anal-
ysis of Barbour and Berttoti outlined above, shows that the necessary and sufficient autonomous
system required to predict future states from initial states does not require a specification of the
centre-of-mass velocity of the system, which is arbitrary. Thus, the PESA prescribes that the
centre-of-mass velocity is not a Poincaré observable because of the necessity criterion (iii).25 More-
over, because global Galilean boosts leave the Poincaré observables invariant, they are universal
symmetries of Newtonian mechanics by our definition.
The PII can then be invoked to argue that all representations that differ only by the value
of the centre-of-mass velocity are indiscernible and therefore should be ontologically identified.
This agrees with modern orthodoxy regarding the role of global boosts in Newtonian mechanics as
expressed for instance in Saunders (2013) and Knox (2014). In this case, the PESA in combination
with the PII has orthodox intuitions.
3.1.2 Galileo’s ship: boosts as a subsystem symmetry
In the previous section, we focused attention on the case where the boosts act on isolated sys-
tems. We now turn attention to the more familiar context in which the boosts act uniformly on
approximately isolated subsystems of the universe but leave the rest of the system’s structures
invariant.
This context is nicely illustrated by the Galileo ship scenario. In this scenario, a ship is floating
frictionlessly (or nearly so) on water in such a way that it has uniform velocity relative to a shore.
Galileo famously remarked that if you are below deck and all the windows of the ship are closed,
then it would not be possible to detect observables differences between situations where the ship was
moving with different uniform velocities relative to the shore (Galilei, 1953, pp. 186-187 (Second
Day)):
“...have the ship proceed with any speed you like, so long as the motion is uniform and
not fluctuating this way and that. You will discover not the least change in all the
effects named, nor could you tell from any of them whether the ship was moving or
standing still.”
The ‘effects named’ in the above quote are examples given by Galileo — such as the flight path of
butterflies or the trajectories of fish swimming in a bowl. These phenomena can be represented as
rigid bodies in the Newtonian system described by the Lagrangian (4). The ship and all the bodies
in it form a subsystem of the universe that behaves, for all practical purposes, as if it is isolated
from the rest of the system.
What is different from this context and that treated in the previous section is that here there
are means to detect relative motion between the ship and the shore. As Galileo observers, if one
climbs above the deck of the ship “more or less noticeable differences would be seen in some of the
effects noted.” In this case, empirical adequacy cannot be achieved if the centre-of-mass velocity
25Autonomy can be achieved in all the examples studied in Section 3 by expressing the equations of motion using
Jacobi’s principle following the analysis of Barbour & Bertotti (1982). Doing this does not change the quantitative
predictions of any of these theories.
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of the ship is allowed to vary arbitrarily: changing the velocity of the ship will obviously lead to
discernible changes in the ship’s motion relative to the shore.
Unlike in the universal case, empirical adequacy can only be achieved if the relative velocity
of the ship and shore is taken to be a Poincaré observable. In a theory that includes this as
an observable because of the sufficiency criterion (ii), the Galilean boosts of Galileo’s ship are
subsystem symmetries by our definition: they act invariantly on the ship and the shore but not
invariantly on the relative velocity of the ship and shore. In this case, the PII should not be
invoked to identify states where the ship is boosted relative to the shore. Our framework for
symmetries therefore reproduces the well-recognised view that subsystem symmetries can have
empirical significance.
3.2 Kepler’s third law
3.2.1 Dynamical similarity as a subsystem symmetry
In the previous section we showed how the PESA can be used in conjunction with the PII to
reproduce orthodox views regarding the ontological status of boost symmetries in Newtonian me-
chanics. In this section, we will showcase the power of the PESA by applying it the less familiar
symmetry of dynamical similarity. As we will see in Section 4.1.1, dynamical similarities have
formal features that make them inapplicable to standard symmetry treatments such as Noether’s
theorem or the Dirac constraint algorithm. But because the PESA applies to any theory whose
laws can be expressed as dynamical equations, it can be applied to any general system that has a
dynamical similarity. We begin our analysis with the well-studied context of dynamical similarity
arising in Kepler’s third law to illustrate how the PESA can be applied more generally. We will
show explicitly at the end of this section that the dynamical similarities that act in Kepler’s law
exactly fit our definition of a subsystem symmetry.26
To see the relationship between dynamical similarity and Kepler’s third law, consider two bodies
co-orbiting under an inverse square law of attraction. It is well-known (see for example (H. Goldstein
et al., 2002, §3.7)) that the trajectories of these bodies are described by conic sections, which in
turn are defined by their semi-major axis and eccentricity. We denote the separation of the bodies
by r. In the context we are interested in this section, which is also the context in which Kepler’s
laws where originally proposed, the two-body system is further described by the angle θ made
by a line between them to a fixed orientation with reference to some idealized distant stars. For
simplicity we can absorb all constants such as the masses and the gravitational coupling into the
single constant C such that the Lagrangian for the system takes the form:

















We will now define a transformation D that acts on both r and t while leaving θ and C fixed
in such a way that the Lagrangian is rescaled. Let us pick a positive real number β. If we let
D : r → βr and D : t → βαt we see that if we choose α = 3/2 then the Lagrangian is rescaled
under D : L → β−1L. Because D rescales L and therefore the action, it is a dynamical similarity
by our definition. This in turn implies that D preserves the stationary points of the theory, and is
therefore a symmetry.
An immediate consequence of D being a symmetry of the Kepler problem is the recovery of
Kepler’s third law, which can be stated as follows:
26Incidentally, this makes dynamical similarity one of the oldest known dynamical symmetries.
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For every solution to the two body problem with a semi-major axis length l and period
T , there exists a solution with semi-major axis βl whose orbital period is β3/2T for all
positive real numbers β.
This follows trivially from the action of D because of the scaling properties of length, via the
transformation of r, and duration, via the transformation properties of t.
Because D acts equally on points along a trajectory, both semi-major and semi-minor axes are
equally rescaled, and hence any solution is mapped onto one that has the same eccentricity. Under
this transformation the total energy of the system, H = T+V , transforms non-trivially but surfaces
of constant energy are merely rescaled: D : H → β−1H, and therefore their shape is preserved.
Likewise the angular momentum is also rescaled: J = r2θ̇ →
√
βJ , as is expected from the fact
that the action, and therefore the standard of angular momentum, is rescaled in the same way.
We now turn to the question of whether Kepler’s third law was formulated in the universal or
the subsystem context. If the two bodies are taken to represent an idealisation of a planet-sun
system in our solar system, then a transformation that changes the energy and angular momentum
of this two-body system is clearly intended to represent a discernible change. This is because the
transformation D is intended to act uniformly on one particular planet-sun system while keeping
the motion of other planets and the distant stars fixed.
The PESA therefore prescribes, by the sufficiency criterion (ii), that in an empirically adequate
theory β should be a Poincaré observable. To determine β the value of the rescaled semi-major
axis and orbital period can be compared with the value of the semi-major axes and orbital periods
of the remaining planets in the solar system. Since D acts invariantly on the observables of the
two-body subsystem but does not leave invariant the Poincaré observable β, D fits our definition of
a subsystem symmetry of the Newtonian N -body problem. Kepler’s third law is therefore clearly
applicable to the subsystem context. As in the case of Galileo’s ship, the PII is blocked and
Kepler’s third law has direct empirical consequences in accordance with standard interpretations.
Once again, the PESA has reproduced orthodoxy.
3.2.2 Dynamical similarity as a universal symmetry
In this section we imagine a hypothetical thought experiment where dynamical similarity is being
studied for the Kepler problem in the universal context. This is similar to the hypothetical world
considered by Poincaré in Chapter 7 of Science and Hypothesis that we described in Section 2.2.1,
but adapted to dynamical similarity rather than to rotation. In this thought experiment, we imagine
that there is no other matter content in the universe aside from two self-gravitating bodies and
a collection of infinitely distant stars that have fixed relative configurations amongst themselves
on the celestial sphere i.e., they are literally dots on the celestial sphere. These stars provide a
reference frame for determining the orientation of a line connecting the two bodies expressed as
an angle, θ, between this line and one of the distant stars. While θ can be empirically determined
using the system of distant stars as a reference, in this world the distance r between the two bodies
cannot be compared to any other length.
On the other hand, the relative instantaneous rate of change, 1r
dr
dθ , that uses the dimensionless
angle θ as a clock can be empirically accessible because the relative change of the size of the system
can be instantaneously compared with rate of change of θ. This is a possible observable quantity
that can be represented in a dynamical system where instantaneous change is empirically accessible.
Because there is one internal clock and two dimensionless velocities in terms of this clock, we expect
an autonomous system of three variables to be required for empirical adequacy in this hypothetical
world.
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Our task now is to find a representation of this autonomous system. We start with a represen-
tation of the system in terms of the configuration variables r and θ and their velocities as measured
by some auxiliary clock t. We take the Lagrangian for the system to be that of the standard Kepler
Lagrangian (8). The empirical inaccessibility of r suggests that it is surplus, and that it should be
removed. The subtlety, as always, lies in removing the dependence of t on the length standard used
to define r. Because this standard determines the unit of the action, we simply need to find a set
of variables for the entire isolated system that is invariant under the dynamical similarity transfor-
mation D defined in the previous section. In other words, we are looking for a representation of
the system where dynamical similarity is treated as a universal symmetry.
A general procedure for reducing an isolated dynamical system to an autonomous system in-
variant under dynamical similarity was developed in Sloan (2018). An outline of this procedure is
given in Section 4.2 with a brief technical description in Footnote 41. The output of the procedure
is a particular (non-unique) representation of an algebra of invariants for the system and a projec-
tion of the dynamical equations generated by the Lagrangian onto this space of invariants. For the
purposes of this section, we will simply give one such representation. In Appendix A we show how
the representation used in this section can be generalised to an arbitrary homogeneous potential.









r3/2θ̇ and θ form an algebra invariant under D.27 We can construct this set by determining the
transformation properties of the velocities and multiplying by the appropriate power of r that
leaves the combination invariant. In terms of this algebra, it is a short calculation to show that the











+ b , (9)
where θ has been used as an internal clock. This dynamical system is therefore equivalent to
the original dynamical system defined by (8) but with all standards of length removed (including
those appearing in temporal intervals). This three-dimensional reduced system is autonomous and
has the necessary and sufficient number of base elements for achieving empirical adequacy in this
hypothetical world. The PESA therefore prescribes that a, b and θ should be Poincaré observables
for this theory. It is important to note that the system defined by (9) is not a standard Hamiltonian
system (we will see why we expect this more generally in Section 4.1.1), and therefore standard tools
for analysing symmetries, such as Noether’s theorem and the Dirac algorithm, are not applicable.
It is a distinct advantage of the PESA that it can provide a concrete specification of the observable
algebra for this system.
Clearly it is difficult to have clear intuitions for what phenomena could be observed in such a
hypothetical world. Adding only a bit of structure, however, allows us to see how the PESA does
lead to intuitive results, and greatly illuminates how more conventional physics is embedded in the
formalism of dynamical similarity in the universal context.
The difficulty in the previous example is that the orbital radius r and period T rely implicitly
on spatial and temporal standards, and are therefore not invariant under dynamical similarity. If,
however, we make use of spatial and temporal standards within the system, then a more intuitive
picture emerges.
27In this representation of dynamical similarity the constant C is taken to be invariant under D. This set of
invariants can be constructed from the symplectic 2-form and the action of D using ρ = r1/2 (see Footnote 41 for the
definition of ρ and a brief description of this construction).
28The first order form of this system highlights the number of independent initial data and the conditions for
integrability — both of which are integral to the PESA.
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We can add such structures to our hypothetical system by considering an idealisation of the
Earth-Sun system where the Earth is taken to be a uniform sphere29 of radius R that has a constant
rotational velocity φ̇ about its axis of rotation. The angle φ can be determined by marking a fixed
position on the Earth and taking the angle between this and a reference star on the rotational














where again we have absorbed units of mass and factors of G into the constant C.
The equation of motion for R tells us immediately that R is a constant of the motion — as
expected for the radius of the Earth. We can therefore use it to set a natural standard for length
in the system. By multiplying by the appropriate powers of R, we can easily construct an invariant
notion of radial distance between the Earth-Sun system by forming the ratio: γ = rR and an
invariant momentum using p = R1/2ṙ = R3/2γ̇. Noting that θ and φ are already invariant, we can




= γ2R3/2θ̇ pφ = R
3/2φ̇ . (11)
In terms of these variables, time derivatives always appear in the equations of motion with the
pre-factor R3/2, which cancels the transformation of t under D by construction.
We can obtain a scale-free autonomous system by switching to an internal clock. For this
system, a natural choice is a rescaling of φ such that R3/2 dφdtφ = 1, where we define tφ ∝ φ. Such a
choice is always available for this system because φ̇ and R are constants of motion of the original
system. Physically, the clock tφ can be interpreted as reading out a sidereal day. In terms of tφ, a
short calculation shows that the equations of motion for the system reduce to:
p = γ′ p′ = − C
γ2
(12)
θ′ = γ2pθ p
′
θ = 0 , (13)
where primes indicate derivatives with respect to tφ. We thus obtain the equations of motion for
the original Kepler system (8) but with length standards given by the radius of the Earth and
temporal standards given by the sidereal day.
This example illustrates that the PESA reproduces our intuitions for a closed dynamical system
with internally defined standards for length and duration. This provides more evidence that the
PESA is a reliable symmetry principle for when we apply it in a novel way to the cosmological
applications of Section 5. The dynamical similarity D acts on representations of length in such a
way that the privileged rod, in this case of radius of the Earth, gets rescaled in exactly the same
way as the distances being measured, in this case the radial distance between the Sun and the
Earth. Similarly, representations of time intervals are also rescaled so that the number of sidereal
days in a sidereal year is fixed. One obtains the standard Kepler system precisely because the rods
and clocks used to describe the autonomous motion are dynamically isolated from the rest of the
system.
Let us make a couple important comments to help build intuition for the role of dynamical
similarity in physical systems. The case treated above is an example of a more general result
29This idealisation serves only to fix the factor of proportionality between R2 and the momentum of inertia. It can
therefore be straightforwardly generalised.
30This set of invariants can be constructed by using ρ = R1/2. See Footnote 41 for details.
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that a conservative system can always be approximately recovered from a dynamically similar one
when the internal rods and clocks used to describe the motion are approximately dynamically
decoupled from the system itself. In the Kepler system, this also provides a vivid illustration of
the difference between the universal and subsystem contexts: a subsystem transformation that
rescales the orbital radius and period but keeps the length R and and sidereal time tφ fixed will
produce an empirically distinct model of the system. This is one way (and perhaps an historically
accurate way) to understand Kepler’s third law. In the universal context one simply investigates
indiscernibility under different representations of the same internal clocks and rods.
What makes the standard Kepler picture work is therefore the dynamical isolation of the internal
clocks and rods. This, however, is necessarily an idealisation because in order to gain knowledge
of the value of any clock or rod, an observer must interact with it — even if only very weakly.
In practice, because there is no gravitational screening, no clock or rod can ever be perfectly
isolated from the system it is describing. In the Earth-Sun system, the sidereal day is affected
by, among other things, the tidal drag between the Earth and the Moon, and is therefore not a
dynamically isolated clock. Dynamically similarity becomes particularly important in such cases
because the system can no longer be idealised by a conservative system and instead exhibits friction-
like behaviour. As we will see in Section 5.1, nowhere is this more important than in the cosmological
case. There, the expansion of the universe affects all clocks in the universe and implies that, on
cosmological time-scales, the system is non-conservative. As we will see, this leads to significant
implications for several conceptual problems in cosmology.
4 Dynamical similarity
In this section we give a general definition of dynamical similarity for Lagrangian systems and a
brief outline of some of the geometric structures that underlie the framework. We will see that a key
mathematical tool in our analysis will be the odd-dimensional cousin of symplectic geometry called
contact geometry, and that conservative Hamiltonian systems exhibiting dynamical similarity will
generically have a description in terms of contact Hamiltonian systems. For more details on the link
between dynamical similarity and contact Hamiltonian mechanics, see Sloan (2018). For a more
details regarding the mathematical construction of contact Hamiltonian systems see Appendix 4
of Arnol’d (2013) and de León & Lainz Valcázar (2019); Bravetti et al. (2017). Bravetti (2018)
gives a recent review with applications to thermodynamics and Geiges (2008) gives a detailed list
of proofs of all relevant theorems.
4.1 General definition
We are primarily interested in understanding the action of dynamical similarity in Lagrangian
systems in the universal context. In this context, states related by dynamical similarity are thought
to be indiscernible, and a mathematical procedure for identifying such states is motivated by the
PII. We will now give such a procedure by defining equivalence classes of DPMs under dynamical
similarity. The equivalence relations thus obtained defines a projection from the original system to a
smaller autonomous system that is invariant under dynamical similarity. In this way, the procedure
is analogous to the reduction of a system by a gauge transformation as is familiar to standard gauge
theory. We will not pursue a complete geometric construction here, but will outline a coordinate-
based approach, motivated by a powerful theorem, that we will illustrate in the applications of
Section 5.
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4.1.1 A non-symplectic symmetry
We begin by highlighting the way in which dynamical similarities are importantly different from
most standard gauge symmetries studies in the literature. This will also allow us to give a more





dtL(q, q̇) , (14)
where L(q, q̇) is the Lagrange density of the system; (q, q̇) are generalized coordinates and their
velocities providing coordinates for the tangent bundle, TC, over the configurations space C, t is
the time parameter, and γ are the kinematically possible models of the theory. As stated in the




= 0 . (15)
Now consider the general class of transformations D that act on the basic structures of a theory31
such that the pullback of the action S by D is
D∗S → cS + Φ , (16)
for some constant Φ and some non-zero positive constant c. The transformation D is the most
general transformation that preserves the DPMs of the theory.
An important way to characterise the different symmetries of D can be made using the Hamil-
tonian formalism. This formalism exists when one can write the Lagrangian in the form Ldt =
pdq−Hdt, where the term θ = pdq is called the symplectic potential. The symplectic potential can
be thought of as providing the relationship between the generalised momenta p and the velocities
q̇ via the definition p = ∂L∂q̇ , and is therefore central to the formation of geometric structures on
phase space. An example of such a structure is the natural volume element on phase space called
the Liouville measure, which can be conveniently written in the language of differential forms or







dNp dNq , (17)
where N is the dimension of C and d is the exterior derivative operator on phase space. An
important requirement for the Hamiltonian to exist is therefore that the volume-form defined by
µL(R) be non-degenerate.
To understand the significance of the symplectic potential, consider what happens when the
theory undergoes a transformation that shifts it by an exact differential θ → θ+ dφ. Under such a
transformation, Ldt → Ldt + dφ, where φ is an arbitrary phase space function, and the action is
shifted by a constant: S[γ]→ S[γ] + φ
∣∣t1
t0
.32 This case thus corresponds to a symmetry D in which
c = 1. Motivated by the fact that the exterior derivative operator on phase space satisfies d2 = 0,
we can define the symplectic 2-form ω = dθ that characterises symplectic structure. Symmetries
for which c = 1 preserve the symplectic 2-form, and we will therefore refer to them as symplectic
symmetries.33
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the symplectic structure defined by ω in formulating
the Hamiltonian mechanics of dynamical systems. We’ve already mentioned how the natural notion
31We will be more explicit about what these structures are in Section 4.1.2.




33Symplectic symmetries are often referred to as divergence symmetries (see, for example, Belot (2013) and Olver
(1993)) because they shift the Lagrangian by an exact form.
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of volume on phase space can be defined in these terms. Perhaps even more important is the fact
that the dynamical equations themselves in the form of Hamilton’s equations are also expressed
in terms of the inverse of ω. Even the quantum formalism is motivated by the preservation of
the anti-commutation relation between q and p that arise through the definition of ω. It is thus
not surprising that symplectic symmetries play an important role in physics and are the subject
of most of literature on this topic. A simple example of symplectic symmetries is the Galilean
boost symmetries of Section 3.1 — as is illustrated by Equation 7. Indeed, using techniques similar
to those used in that section it is straightforward to show that all the Galilean symmetries are
symplectic symmetries of Newtonian mechanics.
Dynamical similarities, on the other hand, correspond to the case where c 6= 1 according to the
definition given in Section 1.2, and are therefore non-symplectic symmetries. It is rather remarkable
that the physics and philosophy literature has focused almost entirely on symplectic symmetries
while almost ignoring the obvious generalisation to c 6= 1.34 In fact, all the interesting features
of dynamical similarity that will be introduced in Section 4.3 and studied in the applications of
Section 5 are due to the non-symplectic nature of the dynamical similarities. Moreover, it is because
of the non-symplectic character of dynamical similarity that standard symmetry techniques do not
apply, and why an analysis in terms of the PESA is necessary.
4.1.2 The action of dynamical similarity
To understand how dynamical similarities act on the basic structures of a theory, first recall that
the action can be written in terms of the Hamiltonian as
S =
∫
dt (q̇ · p−H) . (18)
In order for the pullback of S to have the form (16) under D, we must have that the phase space
quantities below transform as
D∗pdq = cpdq + dφ (19)
D∗Hdt = cHdt+ dφ . (20)
We further restrict D to be such that it has a group action on Γ. Under this restriction, all
symmetry transformations of D depend only on upon the instantaneous state of the system (i.e.,
the values of q and p), the choice of Hamiltonian H and the time parameter t. Moreover, such a
symmetry will map the structures of a theory to structures in the same theory. The group action
of D on Γ can be conveniently expressed in terms of the infinitesimal representations:35
δDq = nq + {q, φ} δDp = (1− n)p+ {p, φ} (21a)
δDH = ΛH+ {H, φ} δDt = (1− Λ)t , (21b)










34An exception being the scaling symmetries discussed in Belot (2013), which can be shown to be dynamical
similarities.
35For simplicity in this paper we work with explicit expressions in terms of Darboux coordinates on Γ. For the
more geometrically inclined reader, these definitions are equivalent to requiring that the tangents, vD, to the orbits
of D in Γ are defined implicitly as the unique solution to: ιvDω = θ + dφ, where ω and θ are the symplectic 2-form
and symplectic potential respectively and ι denotes the interior product on the exterior algebra of Γ.
36Note that the equations (21) are partial differential equations for φ on phase space. We are not aware of any
general existence theorems for these equations, but we can show that solutions exist for all the examples treated in
this paper.
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The first line (21a) indicates that the dynamical similarity D rescales the coordinates q and p of
phase space in such a way that the combination q · p, which has the units of the action (or angular
momentum), gets rescaled by a constant. The transformation D therefore relates representations
of the system with different conventions for the unit of angular momentum — in line with our
general expectations for a dynamical similarity. The extra Poisson bracket terms involving φ in the
first line reflect the freedom to absorb units differently into either the momentum variables p or
the configuration variables q. The function φ encodes all the different possibilities for doing this.
For example, n can be redefined arbitrarily to n→ n+m by shifting φ by mp · q.37
One important consequence of dynamical similarities being non-symplectic symmetries is that
they do not preserve the Liouville measure µL. This can easily be seen by noting that the transfor-
mations (21a) rescale the coordinates q and p in such a way that the integrand of (17) is necessarily
rescaled. This means that the natural notion of volume on phase space is not invariant under
dynamical similarity. Some of the consequences of this will be explored in Section 4.3 and studied
explicitly in the applications of Section 5.
In general the Hamiltonian, H(q, p, ki), will be a function both of the phase space variables
(q, p) and of certain coupling constants ki, which often carry units themselves. If we assume for
simplicity that these couplings are invariant under D,38 then H will transform in a fixed way once
a choice for φ is made in the first line. The second line (21b) should therefore be regarded either
as a consistency requirement with the first line or as an independent equation that fixes Λ in terms
of φ and n. We will see in concrete examples, including the all-important cosmological case of
Section 5.1.1, that satisfying (21b) can lead to highly restrictive conditions on the possible choices
of φ, n and Λ.
4.1.3 The subsystem context
While most of this section is concerned primary with treating dynamical similarity in the universal
context, it can also be useful to understand the considerations that are relevant for dynamical
similarity in the subsystem context. In general, if a theory has a subsystem symmetry (recall our
definition in Section 2.1.2) then the Lagrange density of a theory can be decomposed as
L = Lsub + Linv + Lint . (22)
In this decomposition, the term Linv only depends upon the structures that are invariant under
the symmetry, the term Lsub only depends upon the structures on which the subsystem symmetry
acts, and the interaction term Lint involves the interaction of these two structures.
The invariance property of Linv, the transformation properties of Lsub and the linearity of the
variations δ imply
D∗δS → D∗δSinv +D∗δSsub +D∗δSint = D∗δSint , (23)
for any value of c and φ. We therefore find that a sufficient condition for a system to have an exact
(or approximate) subsystem symmetry is that the interaction term, Sint, between the subsystem
structures and the invariant structures be exactly (or approximately) zero. Moreover, this condition
does not depend on whether the symmetry is symplectic or not.39
37This freedom reflects the ability to redefine a dynamical similarity up to a canonical transformation. In many
concrete problems it is useful to make use of this freedom to find the appropriate representation of dynamical similarity
for the system in question.
38We have already stated that this assumption is not particularly well-motivated but will forgo a more detailed
analysis of the more general case for future work.
39Thus, dynamically similar systems can display subsystem-recursivity as defined in Wallace (2019a). Note however
that a dynamical similarity that acts on a subsystem is not a dynamical similarity of the entire system even if it is a
symmetry.
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The universal/subsystem distinction is thus indifferent to the symplectic properties of a sym-
metry. Intuitions about subsystems gained by studying standard gauge symmetries can therefore
remain more-or-less intact when studying dynamical similarity. This can be seen explicitly in
the Galilean ship example of Section 3.1.2 and the Keplerian example of Section 3.2.1. In both
examples, it is the dynamical isolation of the subsystem that permits a subsystem symmetry.
4.2 Contact geometry and dynamically similar evolution
In this section we will see how to construct a system of dynamically-similar invariants for a conser-
vative Lagrangian system. The invariant description will no longer be conservative and will display
friction-like behaviour. To see this, let us begin with Hamilton’s equations, which specify the DPMs




= {q,H} ṗ = −∂H
∂q
= {p,H} , (24)
where the Hamiltonian H has no explicit dependence on t. It is straightforward to show that the
evolution equations preserve the value of the Hamiltonian, which is interpreted as the total energy
E of the system, and that the system is therefore conservative.
As we have defined them in Section 4.1.2, dynamical similarities have a one-dimensional group
action on phase space parametrised by the group parameter c. We therefore expect D to define
one-dimensional orbits on the phase space Γ, and that the space of dynamically-similar invariants
should be odd-dimensional with one dimension less than Γ. For this reason, contact geometries,
which are odd-dimensional, are an ideal tool for representing such systems. We will now briefly
review these geometries. See the references cited at the beginning of Section 4 for more details and
proofs.
Contact geometries are constructed to be such that vector fields on them can always be divided
into a vertical subspace, which can loosely be thought of as spanning the odd dimension, and
an horizontal subspace, which is even dimensional and symplectic.40 According to a theorem by
Darboux, a canonical choice of local coordinates (Q,P,A) can always be found such that (Q,P )
are canonically conjugate coordinates along the horizontal directions and A is a coordinate along
the vertical direction. The geometry of a contact manifold is specified by a contact 1-form η that
can be written in these canonical coordinates as
η = PdQ− dA (25)
in analogy to the symplectic potential θ = pdq of a phase space. In the same way that the geometry
of a symplectic manifold is specified by the symplectic 2-form, the geometry of a contact manifold is
specified by the contact 1-form. Moreover, just as the symplectic 2-form is required to be such that
the Liouville measure is non-zero, the contact 1-form is required to be such that the volume-form
µc = η ∧ (dη)N−1 (26)
on the contact manifold is non-degenerate. In fact, this non-degeneracy requirement is a necessary
and sufficient condition for η to be a contact 1-form.
The first goal is to find a maximal set of independent phase space functions that are invariant
under dynamical similarity. Once this is a achieved, the challenge is to find an autonomous set
of evolution equations that will evolve the invariant quantities in the same way as Hamilton’s
40The vertical subspace is simply the kernel of dη (with η defined by Equation 25) and the horizontal subspace by
the kernel of η.
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equations (24). In this way, the new system will evolve identically to the original system as far
as any invariant quantities are concerned. It is in finding such evolution equations that contact
geometry is useful. Towards this end, it will be useful to construct a contact 1-form directly in
terms of these invariants.
A simple way to construct the required invariant 1-form is to follow the procedure used in
Section 3.2 and Appendix A, which mirrors the general procedure developed in Sloan (2018). In
the examples considered in those sections, we found a function on phase space, which in general we
can call ρ, that scales in the same way as the Lagrangian under D. Then we use this function to
rescale all other quantities on Γ in a way that the combination is invariant under D. For example,




where Λ is determined by the choice made in (21b). Using a bit of ingenuity, or the geometrically
inspired procedure of Footnote 41, one can obtain a full set of invariants from the original phase
space functions q and p by multiplying by powers of ρ such that η takes the standard form (25).
The difficulty, of course, is not in finding an invariant set, but one in which a contact form η can
be constructed that can lead to a simple set of evolution equations.
To construct such evolution equations we are guided by contact geometry. On a contact mani-
fold, if one is given some function Hc, which we will call a contact Hamiltonian, then it is always
possible to construct a contact vector field using η that is generated by Hc.41 This procedure is
analogous to how one can use the usual Hamiltonian function to generate Hamilton’s equations
using the symplectic 2-form in standard Hamiltonian mechanics. Using this procedure, one can
pick a contact Hamiltonian Hc such that the evolutions equations are equivalent to (24). It turns














While the explicit form of the equations depends on the choice of ρ, it can be shown42 that different
choices of ρ lead to an equivalent set of equations of motion. We are thus lead to a unique
autonomous system of equations (up to coordinates transformations that preserve the contact
form) in terms of a set of invariants of D.43 While the system (28) is explicitly non-symplectic, it
can nevertheless be cast as a theory that satisfies evolutions equations of the form (2). The PESA
is therefore straightforwardly applicable to dynamically similar systems.
4.3 Friction, Janus points and attractors
In this section we study some of the consequences of the invariant evolution equations (28). Because
the space of invariants is a contact manifold and not a symplectic manifold, the equations of motion
41More concretely, the invariant contact form can be constructed from some phase space function ρ satisfying
LDρ = ρ using η =
ιDω
ρ
. The contact Hamiltonian is related to the projection, pH , of the Hamilton vector field of
the Hamiltonian function vH onto the orthogonal compliment of D via Hc = ιpHη. See Bravetti et al. (2017) or de
León & Lainz Valcázar (2019) for more details on how to construct the contact Hamiltonian.
42Since ρ is defined by LDρ = ρ, any other function ρ
′ must be related to ρ by ρ′ = αρ, where α is an invariant:
LDα = 0. The contact form η
′ defined via the procedure in Footnote 41 can then be related to η by performing a
contact transformation. The projection pH , and therefore Hc, is then also invariant up to a contact transformation.
43Recently, it has been emphasised in Sloan (2020) that the equations of motion (28) can be obtained by a variational
principle first proposed by Herglotz (Herglotz, 1979; Guenther et al., 1996) in which the action only involves invariants
of D.
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(28) cannot be written in the simple Poisson-bracket form (24). Instead, friction-like terms linear
in the momenta P appear in the equations for Ṗ and Ȧ. These arise as advertised because of the
non-symplectic character of D. Unlike the symplectic equations (24), the friction-like equations (28)
are not invariant under the usual time-reversal operation. We discuss the potential implications of
this for addressing the problem of the arrow of time in Section 5.3.
One way to understand the friction-like behaviour of the system physically is to consider that
the contribution of the total energy of the system due to ρ is not included in the invariant system
because ρ is used to set the standard of length, and is therefore not itself empirically accessible.
Removing ρ from the system therefore removes its contribution to the total energy in the redundant
representation. The energy of the remaining system must then compensate for this, and this com-
pensation appears in the friction-like terms of (28). In a genuine frictional system, the energy losses
due to friction are interpreted as being dissipated into degrees of freedom that are epistemically
inaccessible for practical reasons. In contrast, in dynamically similar systems changes in energy
can either be losses or gains depending on the dynamics of ρ, and these changes are due to the
impossibility of being able to observe of the overall scale of the system. We thus use the word
‘friction-like’ to describe the evolution equations (28) since the analogy to friction holds only at the
formal level.
We now investigate some of the consequences of this friction-like behaviour. As already discussed
in Section 4.1.2, the Liouville measure — i.e., the natural notion of volume on phase space — is
rescaled µL(R) → cNµL(R) under D. This means that the volume of a region R in phase space
calculated with the Liouville measure will attribute a volume to states related by D as if they were
ontologically distinct. In the universal context, the necessity criterion (iii) of the PESA used in
conjunction with the PII implies that, when the theory is empirically adequate, states related by
D should be treated as identical. The Liouville measure therefore introduces a distinction without
a difference and is no longer the appropriate measure to use for assigning volumes. What then are
the properties of measures that do respect the PII in the universal context?
To answer this question, we must determine how the evolution of a measure projects onto the
invariant space. To be concrete, let us consider the natural volume form µc(R) on a contact manifold
defined in (26) using η. In the original Hamiltonian system, the Liouville measure is particularly
interesting because it is preserved under the evolution equations (24). The dynamically similar
measure µc(R), however, is not. To see this, we use the equations (28) to evolve µc(R). A short





Thus, when the frictional term in Ṗ of (28) is not zero — i.e., when ∂H
c
∂A 6= 0 — then the natural
volume form on the invariant space evolves according to (29). In particular, when ∂H
c
∂A > 0 we have
standard friction-like behaviour with the measure shrinking in time. In contrast, when ∂H
c
∂A < 0,
the measure is growing in time. This shrinking and growing can be understood as a kind of focusing
(or defocusing) of the dynamical trajectories on the invariant space.
The measure-focusing we have just described has important consequences for many kinds of
scientific inferences made in a theory. When evaluating a particular piece of evidence — for instance
in the context of a Bayesian update of some prior — it is necessary to know the likelihood of that
evidence given the theory. Such likelihoods are usually expressible in terms of measures on the state
space of that theory. But in the universal context, the appropriate measures to use are measures on
the invariant state space. As we have just seen, such projections can have very different behaviour
when compared to measures on the redundant space. These considerations can therefore have a
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dramatic effect on any inference made within a theory. In cosmology, this becomes particularly
relevant as we will explore more fully in Section 5.1.
Janus Points and attractors To end this section, we consider two kinds of privileged structures
on the state space of a theory described by the friction-like evolution equations (28). Before doing so
we note that, because of the relation (29), the quantity ∂H
c
∂A at a particular point along a dynamical
trajectory gives the rate of expansion (or contraction) of the measure µc in an infinitesimal region
around that point. Using this interpretation, we consider points along a dynamical trajectory at
which ∂H
c
∂A , and therefore µ̇c (in an infinitesimal region around that point), changes sign. When
this occurs, the canonical measure goes from focusing to defocusing or vice versa. In Barbour
et al. (2014, 2013); Barbour (2020), it is argued that the direction in which the focusing of the
measure occurs can be taken to define an arrow of time for observers in systems moving along the
trajectories in the focused regions. They call points where such an inflection occurs Janus points,
in reference to the two-faced Roman god of transitions and time, because different local arrows of
time emerge on either side of such points.
Janus points come in two different kinds. The first kind, which we call type 1, occurs when
∂Hc
∂A = 0 but where µ̈c 6= 0. In this case, the measure has an extremum at the Janus point but
this extremum is not a fixed point of the measure. These conditions ensure that two different local
arrows of time will emerge on either side of the Janus point. An example of a type-1 Janus point
is found in the Newtonian N -body gravitational system with zero total energy and zero angular
momentum treated in Barbour et al. (2014).44 In these systems a unique type-1 Janus point occurs
for all solutions when the moment of inertia of the system is minimised.
The only other way for µ̇c to change sign when moving through a state space point x along
a dynamical trajectory is if it runs through infinity at x. More precisely, we define a type-2
Janus point as a state space point x along a dynamical trajectory such that s∂H
c
∂A (x
−) → ∞ and
−s∂Hc∂A (x
+) → ∞, for s ∈ {−1,+1} and where x− approaches x from below and x+ exits x from
above. An important example of a type-2 Janus point can be shown to occur in symmetry-reduced
models of general relativity at the big bang. These models are convenient for describing general
relativity near a singularity and will be studied explicitly in Section 5.2. There, the invariant system
will be seen to evolve smoothly at the Janus point, resolving the usual big bang singularity.
A second class of privileged state occurs when there is a region R in the invariant space that
is such that the asymptotic dynamical flow of the measure converges: limt→∞ µ̇c(R) → 0. In this
case, the region R is a trapped attractive surface or attractor.45 When such a region exists, there
is a basin of attraction B(R) where states evolve dynamically in such a way that the measure is
always shrinking as R is approached. The converse; i.e., a region away from which the measure
is always growing; is called a repellor. Attractors in particular are important in the study of
dynamical systems as they signal the emergence of stable structures that may be used as records
(these stable structures may themselves not be static). We thus find that the friction-like behaviour
of dynamically similar systems entails a rich set of non-trivial structures — Janus points, attractors
and repellors — that don’t exist in conservative systems. We now study how these structures appear
in important applications of general relativity.
44Note that these authors do not distinguish between type-1 and 2 Janus points, which is a language we have
introduced in this text.
45See, for example, Hurley (1982) for a technical definition.
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5 Dynamical similarity in the universe
In this section we apply our analysis of symmetry in the context of modern cosmology. We argue
that standard practice in cosmology is consistent with the universal context of dynamical simi-
larity. We use the PESA to construct a set of Poincaré observables for cosmology and show that
these observables are necessary and sufficient for producing an empirical adequate theory of the
background cosmic geometry. The PII then implies that cosmological models that agree on their
Poincaré observables should represent the same physical state.
We then apply this analysis to a more general class of homogeneous geometries that are believed
to approximate the generic behaviour of general relativistic space-times near a singularity. Remark-
ably, the autonomous evolution of the Poincaré observables for these systems is well-behaved at
the singularity. This suggests a general procedure for resolving singularities in general relativity
using dynamical similarity. We also use the measure focusing in these systems to argue for a new
proposal for an explanation of the arrow of time in terms of Janus points and attractors.
5.1 Conceptual problems in cosmology
Cosmological solutions to Einstein’s equations are found by applying the so-called cosmological
principle. This principle roughly states that on sufficiently large scales the properties of the uni-
verse are the same for all observers. This implies certain symmetries among the largest structures
of the observable universe. Most typically, these symmetries include homogeneity and isotropy.
Homogeneity singles out a privileged notion of simultaneity, and this can be used to demarcate
standards of length and duration. The intuitions developed in the previous sections can therefore
be imported to the relativistic case.
Many conceptual problems in cosmology involve looking for explanations that increase the
credence of a certain hypothesis as compared to some ‘typical’ class of counterfactuals. For example,
inflation is said to solve the flatness problem because, given the assumptions of inflation, the
observed relative flatness of the current universe is, it is claimed, significantly more likely than
if inflation had not happened. Other conceptual problems in cosmology, such as the horizon or
the cosmological constant problems, have a similar logical structure but applied to observations
regarding correlations between apparently causally disconnected regions of space-time and the
value of cosmic acceleration respectively.
What is necessary to formulate all of these problems is a measure on the space of DPMs of
the theory. This measure can be used to compute likelihoods within the theory to quantitatively
evaluate explanatory claims. In particular, a measure for computing the likelihood of inflation
given some matter field dynamics is essential for evaluating any claims about inflation. But as
we saw in Section 4.3, dynamical similarity implies that the natural measure is time-dependent.
The resulting measure focusing therefore significantly affects any explanatory inference made in
cosmology if dynamical similarity is found to be a universal symmetry.
To illustrate these implications, we apply our formalism to homogeneous and isotropic cosmolo-
gies and compute the measure focusing in the natural measure of those theories. We find that the
measure focusing due to dynamical similarity leads to surprising insights regarding the nature of
well-known measure ambiguities for such systems.
5.1.1 Dynamical similarity in Friedmann–Lemâıtre–Robertson–Walker cosmology
Let us now apply our formalism to a theory that can describe the first-order behaviour of our
observable universe after the onset of inflation. The theory in question is flat Friedmann–Lemâıtre–
Robertson–Walker (FLRW) cosmology. This theory assumes a flat, homogeneous and isotropic
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spatial geometry coupled to scalar matter fields φi(t) with an arbitrary potential V (φ). A complete
mathematical treatment of dynamical similarity in this system is given in Sloan (2019).
An Ansatz for the metric of the flat FLRW theory can be expressed in terms of the volume of
(a fiducial cell within) the spatial manifold, v:
ds2 = −dt2 + v2/3
(
dx2 + dy2 + dz2
)
. (30)
Readers may be more familiar with this metric expressed in terms of a scale factor a = v1/3. We
have chosen to use the volume instead of the scale factor in this case as it is more convenient for
constructing the invariant algebra and equations of motion.
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It is straightforward to find a representation of the dynamical similarity transformation, D, for
this system as it acts only on the volume and not on t. Thus, D : v → αv, which suggests using
the spatial volume v as the standard of length for the system. That v is not an invariant of
the original system of variables and can thus be used to set a length standard for the system is
somewhat unsurprising, and relates to a well-known feature of flat FLRW cosmology that solutions
are independent of an overall choice of scale factor (or volume).
Following the procedure described in Section 4.2 and using ρ = v, we find a simple representation
of the Poincaré observables to be the Hubble expansion parameter H = v̇3v , the scalar fields φi and
their invariant velocities φ̇i.
46 Given the invariance of t and φ, the only non-trivial invariant is the
Hubble parameter H. This encodes relative changes of scale in the universe and is observable in
terms of the red-shifting of light emitted from distant galaxies. Thus although the overall scale
(expressed in terms of volume or scale factor) cannot be determined, its relative change (i.e. the
Hubble parameter) can.
To understand how this relative change is manifested in a dynamically similar terms, we can
examine the dynamical equations of the theory. In terms of the Poincaré observables listed above,
the contact equations (28) for this system can readily be computed (see Footnote 46 for more
details). They are found to be expressible as the well-known Klein-Gordon and Friedmann equations
of standard cosmology:
φ̈i + 3Hφ̇i +
∂V
∂φi










In Sloan (2020) these were obtained using a variational principle due to Herglotz which makes no
reference to the volume v. The set of invariants described by the dynamical system above can be
expressed as an autonomous system, for example, by using one of the scalar fields as an internal
clock. Once expressed in this way, the FLRW theory has been written as a set of autonomous
equations invariant under dynamical similarity.
46A representative of the symplectic potential for the FLRW theory is θFLRW = −vdH + πiφdφi, where πiφ = vφ̇i.
Using ρ = v, we find an invariant contact form: ηFLRW = −dH + φ̇idφi, which leads to the invariant algebra above.
The contact Hamiltonian is then HcFLRW = HFLRW/v and the contact equations of motion (28) can be shown to lead
to the equations (32). Note that HFLRW vanishes on dynamical trajectories, which leads to some simplifications.
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The equations we have obtained are the same equations used to described the evolution of the
first order background fields in inflationary cosmology. Given that inflationary theory is empirically
adequate and, in particular, that a specification of the value of v is not required in inflationary
theory for empirical adequacy, the necessity criterion (iii) of the PESA and the PII suggest that
dynamical similarity is a universal symmetry of inflationary theory. Put differently, current best
practice in cosmology is operating in the universal context of dynamical similarity. In this context,
representations of states differing by a dynamical similarity transformation, and therefore by a
choice of v, should be physically identified. While the gauge character of v is widely acknowledged
by cosmologists, many of the consequences of treating dynamical similarity as a universal symmetry
discussed in Section 4.3 are not. We consider some of these consequences now.
5.1.2 Measures focusing, Janus points and attractors in FLRW
The most important characteristic of the scalar field equations (32) is the friction-like character of
the term linear in φ̇i. To understand the effects of this term, consider choosing a quadratic potential
for V (φ). In this case, the equations are mathematically identical to the equations of motion of a set
of harmonic oscillators subject to a frictional term proportional to H. In a representation in terms
of v, the term linear in φ̇ is seen as due to the expansion of universe via the (re-scaled) velocity H
of v. This can be used to model the red-shift phenomena often associated with expansion. In the
invariant picture, the red-shift is described in terms of a damping of the frequency of the scalar
field oscillations. Universal expansion in this context is therefore accounted for in the scale-free
system as a friction-like term in (32). Moreover, it is only through this frictional term that the φi
fields interact: were the Hubble parameter zero, there would be no coupling between the fields at
all. The frictional term is therefore responsible for much of the non-trivial behaviour of the system.
To understand the effect of this frictional term in FLRW cosmology, let us examine its implica-
tion towards the construction of measures. Using our choice of variables, the scalar fields and their
momenta are invariants of D. Since these form a canonical pair, the only non-symplectic element
of the invariant algebra is the Hubble parameter H. As such the contact form can be represented
as η = −dH + φ̇ dφ (see Footnote 46 for more details). As discussed in Section 4.3, the natural
notion of volume on the invariant space is µc = η ∧ dηN , where N is the number of scalar fields.
For simplicity of exposition we will restrict ourselves to the case of a single field.
Our goal is to use µc to compute a measure on the space of DPMs of the theory. To do this,
we must first remember that µc is a measure on the invariant state space, and not the invariant
space of models. We can construct the space of models by choosing a clock internal to the system
and then use this clock to define a surface of initial values. Such a surface will then parametrise
the space of DPMs of the theory because each choice of initial state with the same value of the
internal clock is an initial condition for a different DPM. We can then define a measure on the
space of DPMs by restricting µc to this surface. As a final step, we use the fact that along a DPM
the system obeys the Friedman equation (i.e., the second equation of (32)). If we use a surface of
constant red-shift H = H0 to define an internal clock and solve φ̇ using the Friedman equation, we





− V (φ)dφ . (33)
This measure is very similar to that first developed in Gibbons et al. (1987) (GHS), and later
used in Gibbons & Turok (2008) to argue that inflation is fine-tuned. The key difference is that the
GHS measure was applied to the space of DPMs of the original symplectic system and therefore
included v: ΩGHS = ΩDS∧dv. The difficulty with this measure is that the range of v is unbounded,
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and therefore any measure defined in this way is subject to regularisation ambiguities. These
regularisation ambiguities can be seen through the H0 dependence of ΩDS : the measure depends
on the choice of initial value surface unlike the Liouville measure of symplectic systems. Ironically,
the authors note that physical processes such as inflation can be defined without reference to v but
do not identify dynamical similarity as an explicit symmetry of the system. More importantly, they
do not connect the time dependence of the measure to the non-symplectic character of the gauge
symmetry inherent to this system.
When examining the FLRW system as a friction-like system resulting from a non-symplectic
symmetry, we can examine the effects of measure focusing discussed in Section 4.3. Applying
















Because the natural dynamically similar measure is constructed from the contact form, dynamical
similarity implies a natural ‘volume weighting’ to measures Sloan & Silk (2016) (where by ‘volume’
we mean spatial volume of a fiducial cell). Thus, solutions which undergo the most expansion
between two surfaces of constant red-shift will be those on which the measure focusses (Sloan,
2016). An immediate consequence of this is that de Sitter expansion is an attractive fixed point
of the dynamics since space begins to expand exponentially near such a point. Moreover, near the
big bang at v → 0 the measure diverges and therefore obeys a necessary condition for a type-2
Janus point as defined in Section 4.3. Indeed, in Section 5.2 below we will see that the evolution of
the Poincaré observables is well-defined at v = 0, and that this does indeed correspond to a type-2
Janus point.
The focusing of the measure when using red-shift as an internal clock is apparent from the
H0 dependence of ΩDS in (33). The ambiguity in choosing a measure on the space of models in
FLRW cosmology can then be understood in terms of the time-dependence of the measure due to
dynamical similarity. Because there is no preferred instant to define an initial value surface, the
time variation of the measure immediately implies a kind of ambiguity. This ambiguity, however,
does not extend to the amount of measure-focusing that occurs between two surfaces of constant
red-shift, which is fixed by (34). Being close to de Sitter expansion, as is true in the current epoch,
thus implies that a significant amount of inflation must have occurred in the past. This lends
credence to the hypothesis of an inflationary scenario, as was first pointed out in Corichi & Sloan
(2014).
Note that the measure-focusing implied by dynamical similarity could have significant implica-
tions for many other conceptual problems in cosmology. For example, we will see in Section 5.3
that the time-dependence of the measure can be used to provide an explanation for the arrow of
time in terms of the Janus point and attractor of the FLRW theory. Other conceptual problems
such as the flatness problem or the horizon problem, which depend upon measures on the space of
DPMs in the presence of inhomogeneities, could also be affected. We leave those considerations to
future work.
5.2 Singularity resolution in general relativity
Singularities occur in general relativity when the evolution equations become non-prescriptive. The
precise mathematical characterisation of a singularity can differ depending on the kind of pathology
that one wants to emphasise. In one common usage, a space-time point is said to be singular if some
physically significant curvature invariant (e.g., the Ricci scalar) is divergent there. Singularities of
this kind, although significant in some regard, are usually not seen as fundamental threats to the
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theory. A more worrisome notion of singularity occurs when the equations of motion can no longer
uniquely determine the evolution of the space-time geometry along time-like geodesics within a
finite proper-time. When this occurs, the space-time is called geodesically incomplete and general
relativity is often said to predict its own demise.
It was proven in the famous Hawking–Penrose theorems of Hawking (1976) that geodesic incom-
pleteness is an ubiquitous feature of cosmological space-times in general relativity. The theorems
state that if expansion is occurring and the matter content of the universe obeys certain causally
motivated conditions,47 then the space-time will be geodesically incomplete in the past. If the
conditions in question are satisfied everywhere on a space-like hyper-surface, then all time-like tra-
jectories that intersect this hyper-surface will have started in a singular region often regarded as a
big bang.
What is significant about these theorems is that they involve a failure of the continuity of
the evolution equations of the system at this singular region. In the cosmological case, they are
examples of an application of the Picard–Lindelöf theorems,48 which give conditions under which
a series of differential equations uniquely determine a solution. Broadly speaking, they show that
in a set of (possibly coupled) first order ordinary differential equations, ẋi = fi(xj) there exists a
unique solution whenever the functions fi are Lipschitz continuous in the xj . In the Friedmann
equation of FLRW cosmology, for example, this continuity condition is violated as H → ∞ and
v → 0, and leads to the big bang.
This is where the PESA becomes especially relevant. The PESA demands the essential and
sufficient autonomous system required to achieve empirical adequacy. But as we have shown in
Section 5.1.2 above, empirical adequacy can be achieved even when the variable v has been re-
moved. The standard FLRW system does include v and is therefore sufficient but not necessary
for producing an empirically adequate theory. One can then immediately ask whether the failure
of Lipschitz continuity persists when v is removed from the system? The answer is a resounding
NO: the dynamical equations of the invariant system are fully prescriptive through the big bang!
Instead, the big bang is replaced by a type-2 Janus point as advertised in Section 5.1.2.
This perhaps surprising result was worked out for the FLRW case in Sloan (2019) and, for more
general homogeneous space-times in Koslowski et al. (2018). To illustrate these results here, we will
focus on the algebraically simple case of two free scalar fields evolving on an FLRW background.
The simplicity of the example however does not limit the generality of the result. For full details
of the more general case, we refer the reader to the referenced papers.
5.2.1 Singularity resolution in FLRW space-time
To construct an algebra of Poincaré observables for the FLRW system, we begin by defining a
new set of variables by performing a compactification of the scalar fields to a 2-sphere using the
substitution: φ1 = | tanβ| cosα and φ2 = | tanβ| sinα. The singularity of GR lies at β → π/2,
at which point both φ1 and φ2 tend to infinity. The compactification can be seen as taking the
φ1 − φ2 plane and placing a sphere tangent to the origin. The point φ1, φ2 is projected onto the
sphere by drawing a line from the centre of the sphere to (φ1, φ2). The variable α corresponds
to the longitude on the sphere at which the point intersects the sphere, and β the angle this line
makes with a line from the origin of the plane to the centre of the sphere as shown in Figure 1.
One can then examine the equation of motion for α in terms of β. We note here that φ̇1 and
φ̇2 also tend to infinity at the singularity. We could consider compactifying them in the same way
47More specifically, if a finite region along a slicing of the space-time is backwardly trapped and the matter content
obeys the null energy condition.









Figure 1: The projection from the φ1−φ2 plane onto the sphere in α, β. The singularity of general
relativity is at β = π/2 which is a regular point of the equations of motion on the sphere.
as we did the positions φ1, φ2, onto a second sphere (θ, χ). However, were we to do so, we would
quickly see that at the singularity, θ → α. By examining the equations of motion for the scalar
fields, we see that although θ − α tends to zero, λ = sin(α−θ)cosβ remains non-zero and finite. This


















Remarkably these equations remain finite as we approach the singularity; in the limit as β → π/2,
we see dαdβ → λ and
dλ
dβ → 0. Because of this, they satisfy the conditions of the Picard–Lindelöf
theorem, and thus have a unique solution about this point. In fact the system of equations can
be explicitly integrated. The solutions are geodesics on the sphere. This is the expected geodesic
motion on the (φ1, φ2) plane in the absence of potentials. Since this autonomous system remains
well-posed at the point corresponding to the singularity of general relativity, we can use it to
continue the solutions beyond this point and thus achieved evolution through the big bang. This
evolution, however, goes through a type-2 Janus point as the measure has a divergence at H →∞
(i.e., at the point corresponding to the big bang in the redundant representation) according to (34).
Thus, the big bang is replaced by a smooth type-2 Janus point in the dynamical system prescribed
by the PESA and the requirement of empirical adequacy.
5.2.2 General singularity resolution
An obvious question regarding the results of the previous section is whether they can be generalised
to more generic space-times. After all, the power of the Hawking–Penrose singularity theorems
is that they apply to generic classes of physically plausible solutions of the Einstein equations.
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However, a conjecture by Belinkskii, Khalatnikov and Lifschitz49 suggests that the generic behaviour
of a physically plausible class of solutions of general relativity near singularities can be described
by homogeneous but anisotropic space-times. Such space-times go by the name of Bianchi models
in which space-time is split into the product of a three-dimensional homogeneous spatial manifold
and a one dimensional temporal manifold valued on the real line. The Bianchi models are classified
into eleven types (nine labelled by Roman numerals with two subtypes) according to the structure
of their spatial symmetries. One can therefore dramatically extend the generality of our results by
applying our formalism to the Bianchi models. This has been achieved in Koslowski et al. (2018),
where a rational reconstruction of the analysis suggests that the PESA can be used to produce a
singularity-free evolution in terms of a dynamically similar algebra of Poincaré observables. We
review these results now.
It is convenient to express the Bianchi space-times in terms of Misner variables, which are
covariant vector fields σi on the spatial manifold. In terms of these variables, the metric is




























where the normalizations of q1 and q2 have been chosen so that when expressed as a Lagrangian
theory, their conjugate momenta appear as scalar fields subjected to a potential. This potential
is determined by the symmetries of the spatial manifold, but it always takes a standard form
as a function of the Misner variables multiplied by the volume raised to the one-third power;
i.e., v
1
3Vs(q1, q2). This homogeneity in v is central in establishing the dynamical similarity of these
models because it allows re-scalings of the volume to be understood independently of the remaining
variables. Up to a boundary term which removes the second derivatives of v from the equations,




















The Lagrangian is very similar to that for the FLRW models (31), though instead of matter fields
we have anisotropies, and the coupling to their potential has a different dependence on the volume.
Using the volume scaling of these fields, we can find a representation for the dynamical sim-
ilarity transformation for this model as D : t → αt, v → α3v. This has an intuitive geometrical
interpretation: it rescales each of the four dimensions of space-time equally ds2 → α2ds2.
From the form of D we can find the autonomous algebra, A, of Poincaré observables following
the general procedure outlined in Section 4.2. One such representation that is also dynamically
closed is given by (using ρ = 2v2/3)
A =
{
q1, q2, Ψ1 = v
1
3 q̇1, Ψ2 = v
1







The equations of motion (28) take the form
q̇i = v
− 1























As in our previous examples, we see that an autonomous system independent of v (which we’ve
chosen to set the length standard for this system) can be constructed by using any of the above
49See Belinsky et al. (1970); Uggla et al. (2003); Ashtekar et al. (2011); Belinski & Henneaux (2017).
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invariants as internal clocks. This is of particular importance in addressing the issue of singularities.
The equation of motions for the system, when written in the original set of variables, has terms
that are proportional to v−1. Hence the dynamical equations are not Lipschitz continuous at v = 0,
and the evolution becomes singular.
Rather remarkably, in the autonomous system, this problem is bypassed. The invariant equa-
tions remain Lipschitz continuous throughout the evolution as they are independent of the problem-
atic variable v and hence can be evolved beyond the apparent singularity. This property has been
shown to hold in several systems (Koslowski et al., 2018). In Bianchi systems we can compactify
Ψ1,Ψ2 on a sphere such that Ψ1 = | tanβ| cosα and Ψ2 = | tanβ| sinα following the procedure used
for the FLRW theory of Section 5.2.1. Doing so we see that the singularity of GR is at β = π/2.
Incredibly, this turns out to be a regular point of the equations of motion of the invariant system.
5.2.3 Singularity resolution in black holes?
A natural question to ask at this point is whether the elimination of singular behaviour seen in the
previous sections also occurs in the case of black holes. While we will not claim here to provide
a definite answer to this question, we will highlight some on-going investigations using idealised
models that suggest that dynamical similarity may have important implications for the physics of
black holes.
The interior of a black hole corresponds closely to a Kantowski–Sachs cosmology, which has
the spatial topology of a 2-sphere crossed with a real direction. Under interchange of the time and
radial directions this correspondence is made exact, and so we can examine the evolution of the
interior of a black hole towards the singularity by examining the evolution of a Kantowski–Sachs
space-time towards its big bang. The Kantowski–Sachs space-times can be represented in a way
very similar to the Bianchi models presented above. Applying similar machinery, one can find that
an autonomous system invariant under dynamical similarity can be constructed and has a well-
defined evolution through the point in the dynamics that is singular in general relativity (Sloan &
Mercati, In preparation).
As this construction produces a well-defined dynamical system when the general relativistic
dynamics becomes singular, the question arises as to how this result can be squared with the singu-
larity theorems of Hawking and Penrose. The key to understanding this is to note that the essential
and sufficient autonomous system that is well-defined through the general relativistic singularity is
not itself well-represented by a Lorentzian space-time. At the point of the singularity, the spatial
manifold is found to change its handedness.50 This means that the sign of the determinant of the
spatial metric switches sign precisely when the system passes the singular point.
This is fatal for a description of the system in terms of space-time. The geodesic equation
requires the determinant of the metric to have a well-defined sign, and therefore breaks down at
this point. When this happens, the space-time representation of the system becomes geodesically
incomplete in accordance with the Hawking–Penrose singularity theorem. However, in the universal
context, a change in the handedness of space leads to an indiscernible change in the system since
the internal relations between events remain unchanged.51 Geodesic completeness of this kind in
therefore not sufficient to ensure that the empirically relevant observables of the system are badly
behaved. Indeed, the Poincaré observables for this system do have well-defined evolution through
the point at which parity is changed, and this is all that is required to describe the physical
properties of this system. Of course, it remains to be seen whether such a description of the system
can ever be found to be empirically adequate. There are many open questions left to resolve.
50See Koslowski et al. (2018) for details.
51For a lengthy discussion of this point in relation to a classic discussion initiated by Kant, see Pooley (2003).
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Nevertheless, the Hawking–Penrose singularity theorems are ineffective at signalling a breakdown
of determinism in the dynamically similar theory.
5.3 The problem of the arrow of time
At a macroscopic level, processes occur in a way that defines a significant gradient in time that
is persistent across the observable universe. No supernova has been seen to implode into a star
while a hot cup of coffee cools on a desk. Astrophysical processes and earthly thermodynamic
systems alike seem to unfold in a consistently time-asymmetric way. This monotonic gradient in
time defines a persistent arrow of time across the known universe. Certain quantitative properties
of a system — most commonly the entropy — can be used to give quantitative meaning to this
gradient, and therefore can be used to define time’s arrow. More generally, Price (2002) defines an
arrow of time in terms of the following criteria:
“(i) ... an asymmetry of physical processes in time, not with an asymmetry in time
itself; (ii) that the objective asymmetry concerned comprises a monotonic gradient,
rather than an increase or decrease; (iii) that the asymmetry in nature is a matter of
numerical imbalance between temporal mirror images, not of literal reversibility; and
(iv) that if need be the term ‘entropy’ itself is to be thought of as a kind of variable place-
holder for the relevant properties of a vast list of actual physical asymmetries.”[Original
emphasis.]
A problem occurs when attempting to account for the observed arrows of time in terms of the
microscopic laws of physics. These laws do not exhibit a significant amount of time asymmetry —
certainly nothing like the amount required to explain the enormous temporal gradients observed
across our universe.
A prominent approach to this problem is to postulate a Past Hypothesis (Albert, 2009; S. Gold-
stein, 2001) whereby the earliest known states of the universe are postulated to be highly atypical.
According to the arguments of the Past Hypothesis, if the past states are highly atypical, then
the present state is highly likely be vastly more typical because of a tendency of many dynamical
systems to evolve towards more typical states.52 Thus, the Past Hypothesis is said to provide an
explanation for the existence of a significant gradient in time, which in this case is quantified by the
increase in likelihood of the universe being in a typical state.53 The Past Hypothesis is thus said
to provide an explanation for the arrow of time in terms of fundamentally time-symmetric laws.
What is immediately apparent from the line of reasoning outlined above is that the Past Hy-
pothesis relies very strongly on having an unambiguous measure, stable in time, that can be used to
determine the typicality of a particular state of the world. Ambiguity in the measure is problematic
because different choices of measure could disagree on the significance or direction of the gradient.
Time dependence in the measure is problematic because a time-varying measure could itself be the
source of time-asymmetry, and thus undermine the explanatory force of the Past Hypothesis.54
The arguments of Section 4.3, however, suggest that the natural measures of cosmology, and
indeed of any system where dynamical similarity is a universal symmetry, will evolve in time.
Moreover, because of Equation (34), the amount of measure focusing between two instants is
proportional to the amount of expansion that takes place in the universe between those two instants.
This leads to an enormous amount of measure focusing (∼ 85 orders of magnitude) between the
52See Frigg (2009) for a critique of the dynamical aspects of this argument.
53This likelihood is usually expressed in terms of some version of the Boltzmann entropy of the system.
54See Gryb (2020) for more details on about this argument as well as Curiel (2015) and Earman (2006) on ambiguity
issues regarding the measure in the Past Hypothesis.
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present epoch and the onset of inflation. Thus, when dynamical similarity is taken into account,
the dynamics of the measure itself already provides a gradient in time that is big enough to account
for a significant numerical imbalance, and thereby define a cosmological arrow of time according
to Price’s definition above. Because this arrow of time results from the dynamical equations of the
invariant theory, we have a dynamical explanation of a cosmological arrow that does not involve the
use of a Past Hypothesis. The dynamical nature of this explanation can be seen from the fact that
the friction-like terms of Equations 28 are not invariant under the time reversal operation t→ −t.
It’s important to note however that the mere existence of friction-like terms in the measure
dynamics is not sufficient to provide an adequate explanation of the arrow of time. One might
worry that some form of time-symmetry is encoded in the fact that for every DPM in cosmology
there is a matching DPM that is representationally its time-reversed image. Moreover, as we already
noted, the vast amount of time-asymmetry observed in our universe must be accounted for. These
two issues can be addressed by a scenario first proposed in Barbour et al. (2014) and expanded
upon in Barbour (2020). We will give a slightly modified account here.
In our account, the space of DPMs of a cosmological theory should contain a dense set of DPMs
characterised by a unique Janus point that is in the attractive basin of some attractor for the
system. In such a scenario, an observer described by a state in a DPM near the attractor will
see an arrow of time pointing from the Janus point to the attractor. The divergent amount of
measure-focusing that occurs near the attractor could thus explain the enormous time-asymmetry
seen by such observers, and therefore provide the basis for a cosmological arrow of time of the form
required by Price.
Moreover, a symmetry of the space of DPMs about the Janus points can then explain how
such arrows of time can nevertheless emerge when the system is embedded into a time-symmetric
symplectic system. Because the arrows of time are assigned to observes near attractors, two separate
arrows of time can then emerge for observers along dynamical trajectories pointing towards different
attractors on opposite sides of a Janus point. As we have seen, such a scenario occurs in the
cosmological models studied in Section 5.1 where the generic solutions were seen to exhibit type-2
Janus points in the basins of de Sitter attractors.
Because Janus points are defined by a dynamical condition on the state space, they need only
lie in the attractive basin of the relevant attractor, and can thus belong to a dense set of trajectories
which may well be typical according to some choice of measure. Thus, the existence of a Janus
point is not a Past Hypothesis itself because Janus points can (and do in the examples explored in
Barbour et al. (2014)) belong to a typical set of trajectories.
An open question remains to show that the cosmological arrow of time defined by measure
focusing can be used to recover the local arrows of time (e.g., the thermodynamic and perceptual
arrows, etc) familiar to our everyday experience of the world. This is the subject of on-going
investigations.
6 Conclusions
6.1 Dynamical similarity and cosmology
We have studied several different aspects of dynamical similarity and have shown that there are
good reasons to believe that this symmetry has important implications for cosmology. We found
that removing the “extra mathematical hooks” on which similarity hangs reveals a well-posed
system with a smooth Janus point replacing a violent big bang. Attractors resulting from friction-
like equations lead to an arrow of time for observers, like us, nearing such attractors. When the
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universe is stripped of its dynamically similar structure, it appears simultaneously less pathological
and more comprehensible.
But are we justified in treating as surplus what seems like vital representational structure in
some of our most successful theories? We believe so. To address this question, we have developed
a conceptual framework for identifying surplus structure in a theory. The principle we proposed
— the PESA — prescribes that the observable structure of a theory be the structure that must be
specified in the form of input data in order to uniquely solve the evolution equations. When applied
to cosmology, the PESA combined with the PII prescribes that dynamically similar structure is
indeed surplus.
The implications for treating dynamical similar structure as surplus are profound and, perhaps,
counter-intuitive. It was thus helpful for us to build intuition for dynamical similarity by studying
explicit examples. Perhaps the oldest known example of dynamical similarity is illustrated by Ke-
pler’s third law, which was studied in Section 3.2. What we saw there was that it is important to
distinguish between situations in which a symmetry should be seen to relate discernible and indis-
cernible states. Here too, examples were illustrative. By studying the Galilean boost symmetries
in different scenarios, we were able to see that discernible states are related by symmetries only
when such symmetries act uniformly on subsystems while leaving the remaining system invariant.
This intuition was then applied to Kepler’s third law. In every example studied, the PESA was
found to reproduce orthodox views of symmetry.
This, we believe, gives us confidence that the PESA is a good guide for determining surplus
structure in a theory. Our main motivation for introducing the PESA, however, was to apply it
to dynamical similarity in the cosmological setting, where we’ve obtained novel results regarding
the interpretation of cosmological solutions. The crucial element of the PESA in regards to cos-
mology is the criterion of necessity. This criterion can often be overlooked because a theory can
successfully describe the phenomena even if it has more structure than is strictly necessary. But to
describe cosmological phenomena, our analysis shows that dynamically similar structure is simply
not necessary. No external scale is required to evolve the system: the evolution of the Poincaré
observables we defined in Section 5.1.1 exactly match their evolution in general relativity except
at the big bang. There, it is only surplus structure that ruins the well-posedness of the evolution
equations. When this happens, the “mental structures that we attach to the phenomena” have
the potential to mislead. Stripping ourselves of dynamically similar structure removes the initial
singularity and suggests an alternative explanation for a cosmological arrow of time. In cosmology,
we may therefore have been mislead to believe in a violent beginning and time-symmetric laws.
6.2 Further implications of dynamical similarity
As we saw in Section 4 dynamical similarity is a very general symmetry of any Lagrangian system
in both the universal and subsystem contexts. This suggests that dynamical similarity may have
many more applications to physical systems beyond the limited number of systems studied in this
paper. When the system is conservative, we saw that the mathematics of dynamical similarity is
generically described by contact, rather than symplectic, geometry. But while contact geometry is
less familiar to most physicists than symplectic geometry, contact geometry is nevertheless known
to have a rich mathematical structure.
One potential application of dynamical similarity is in the foundation of thermodynamics and
the identification of certain thermodynamical quantities to apparently conservative systems. Re-
cently, contact systems with equations of motion of the form (28) have been shown to display
strong formal analogies to thermodynamic systems (Bravetti et al., 2015; Bravetti, 2018). Nat-
ural geometric structures on contact manifolds can be used to define thermodynamic quantities
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such as equilibrium states and notions of entropy by taking advantage of measure focusing and
attractors. Using these structures, it is then possible to describe thermodynamic processes such
as approach-to-equilibrium and entropy-production. In the universal context, dynamical similarity
could then be used to write the evolution equations of apparently conservative systems in terms of
quantities that have formal analogies to thermodynamic quantities like entropy. Such an analysis
may be extremely valuable in studying gravitational systems — particularly in cosmology. More
generally, dynamical similarity and contact geometry may prove to be a valuable way to gain a
deeper understanding of the known thermodynamic properties of general relativistic systems such
as black holes.
A final important consideration is the implications of dynamical similarity to quantum mechan-
ics. Because dynamical similarities alter the symplectic structure by rescaling the unit of angular
momentum, dynamical similarities will have important implications for the commutation relations
of quantum mechanics. In the universal context, Planck’s constant ~ must be determined relative
to other standards of angular momentum within the system. At the representational level, this
should imply a dynamical similarity. It is unclear what the precise consequences of this would be
in a universal quantum system, but it is clear that more research into such questions would be ex-
tremely valuable. At the classical level, dynamically similar systems display friction-like dissipative
behaviour. At the quantum level, this may generalise to non-unitary evolution equations, perhaps
in the form of a Lindblad master equation. The implications of this to the foundations of quantum
mechanics, particularly with regard to the role of decoherence, should be further investigated.
A Dynamical Similarity with Homogeneous Potentials
As a way to illustrate the generality of the procedure used in Section 3.2 and to further demonstrate
how to apply to the general method described in Section 4.2, let us consider the case of particles
interacting under a single homogeneous potential.
In this situation, the most general Galilean invariant potential between any two particles is
a power of their separation: V12 = |~r1 − ~r2|n. To best demonstrate dynamical similarity in this
system, will work in a coordinate system in which there is zero net total linear momentum, and
the coordinate origin is set to the centre of mass of the system. We will also work in coordinates in
which the overall size of the system is determined by only one of our dynamical variables, which we
call r. To do this, we describe the motion in the 3p−3-dimensional space, R3p−3, as the product of
the positive real numbers, R+, with coordinate r, and the (3p− 4)-sphere, S3p−4, with coordinates
~θ. Let us define Ks to be the kinetic energy of a particle moving on a unit S
3p−4. For example, on






















. The total potential can be decomposed into a product of a term dependent only on the
radial coordinate, r, and one dependent only on the angles, ~θ: V = rnVs(~θ). In the literature it is







+ r2Ks + r
nVs(~θ) . (41)
We are now in position to repeat the analysis performed in Section 3.2. Under the rescaling
D : r → λr, D : t → λ
2−n
n t we see that DL → λnL, and will again preserve the stationarity
40
condition of the action. The algebra A consisting of the invariants of D is readily established. We
note that under the action of D, each of the angles θi is invariant. Using these invariants and






2 ) and bi = r
2−n
2 θ̇i (for n 6= 2, we will discuss the n = 2 case immediately below). In the
case in which n = −1 this reproduces exactly to the Kepler problem as discussed in Section 3.2.
When n = 2, we reproduce a Hooke potential. In this case, t is unaffected by the transformation
D, and thus the angles as well as their velocities with respect to t are automatically members of the
algebra of invariants, with the remaining basis member being ṙr =
d
dt(log r). Hence we immediately
recover the well-known result that in a system of particles connected by springs (e.g. harmonic
oscillators) the period of oscillation is independent of the overall amplitude of oscillation.
References
Albert, D. (2009). Time and chance. Harvard University Press.
Apostol, T. M. (2012). Modular functions and dirichlet series in number theory (Vol. 41). Springer
Science & Business Media.
Arnol’d, V. I. (2013). Mathematical methods of classical mechanics (Vol. 60). Springer Science &
Business Media.
Ashtekar, A., Henderson, A., & Sloan, D. (2011). A Hamiltonian Formulation of the BKL Conjec-
ture. Phys. Rev. D , 83 , 084024. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevD.83.084024
Barbour, J. (2010). The definition of mach’s principle. Foundations of Physics, 40 (9-10), 1263–
1284.
Barbour, J. (2020). The janus point: a new theory of time. The Bodley Head.
Barbour, J., & Bertotti, B. (1982). Mach’s principle and the structure of dynamical theories.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences,
382 (1783), 295–306. Retrieved from http://rspa.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/
382/1783/295 doi: 10.1098/rspa.1982.0102
Barbour, J., Koslowski, T., & Mercati, F. (2013). A gravitational origin of the arrows of time.
Barbour, J., Koslowski, T., & Mercati, F. (2014, Oct). Identification of a gravitational arrow of time.
Physical Review Letters, 113 (18). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett
.113.181101 doi: 10.1103/physrevlett.113.181101
Belinski, V., & Henneaux, M. (2017). The Cosmological Singularity. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Pr. doi: 10.1017/9781107239333
Belinsky, V., Khalatnikov, I., & Lifshitz, E. (1970). Oscillatory approach to a singular point in the
relativistic cosmology. Adv. Phys., 19 , 525–573. doi: 10.1080/00018737000101171
Belot, G. (2013). Symmetry and equivalence. In R. Batterman (Ed.), The oxford handbook of
philosophy of physics. Oxford University Press.
Belot, G. (2018). Fifty million elvis fans can’t be wrong. Noûs, 52 (4), 946–981.
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